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ABSTRACT 
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) reports that most of large-scale water 
development projects around the world fail to achieve their objectives for sustainable 
human development. Moreover, the EU has set as primary requirements for those states’ 
candidates for full membership, regional stability and respect of human rights in their 
domestic policies. 
In 1989, Turkey implemented a multisectoral Water Development Project (GAP) 
to bring socio-economic development in its undeveloped Southeastern Anatolia region by 
exploiting the Euphrates and Tigris water. However, the GAP project not only has failed 
in meeting its objectives, but also has raised more obstacles for Turkey’s full membership 
to the EU. 
The thesis assesses the GAP project in terms of progress of its objectives by 
scrutinizing the agricultural-energy sector and the socio-economic status of the 
Southeastern Anatolia region. Additionally, this thesis proceeds to conclude the 
assessment by focusing on the role of the project in the stability of the region made-up by 
Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, as well as the status of the internally displaced people as a result 
of the GAP project, within the context of human rights. 
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A. TWENTIETH CENTURY DAMS AND THE GAP PROJECT 
As the only tool for harnessing the power of water, large dams have brought 
human development and economic progress, and should thus be viewed as symbols of 
modernization and the human ability to harness nature.1 At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, dams were dedicated solely to flood prevention and control; later, they became 
essential for irrigation, and ended up embodying multipurpose projects within the context 
of water development. Multipurpose projects address different kinds of needs such as 
navigation, flood control, irrigation, water supply, and hydropower—most recently, 
within the context of “the less water wasted the better.”2 To this end, technological 
advances allow humans to dam, divert and control almost all of world’s powerful rivers 
in order to bring progress, including the growth of cities in deserts, irrigated agriculture to 
feed the ever-growing world population, and energy to boost industry and development.3 
One such technological advance was the improvement of the turbine design, which was 
used widely in large dams generating hydropower, and ushering in the mega-dam boom 
that marked the 1930s.4  
In the above discourse, the essence of “development” is defined strictly in terms 
of the large-scale, technocratic advance of intensive exploitation of water resources for 
the purpose of economic growth.5 However, the above growth is not always accompanied 
                                                 
1World Commission on Dams (WCD), Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-
Making (Earthscan, 2000), xxix. 
2 Julie Trottier and Paul Slack, Managing Water Resources Past and Present: The Linacre Lectures 
2002 (Oxford University Press, 2002), 60. 
3 Fiona Curtin, “Transboundary Impacts of Dams: Conflict Prevention Strategies,” in Dams on 
Transboundary Rivers, edited by Eric Mostert, Contributing Paper to the World Commission on Dams 
(WCD) prepared for Thematic Review V.3: River Basins-Institutional Frameworks and Management 
Options (July 4, 2000), 10.  
4 Stefanie Joyce, “Is It Worth a Dam?” Environmental Health Perspectives 105, no. 10 (October 
1997), 1051. 
5 Sanjeev Khagram, Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water and Power (Cornell 
University Press, 2004), 4. 
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by improvement, which puts into question the “development” brought by big dams. This 
became the turning point, from the 1980s onwards, in the booming history begun in the 
1930s, of large dams and multipurpose projects, where the dam era began to decline as 
the concept of “sustainable development” emerged. The broadly accepted definition of 
“sustainable development” expresses that a fundamental balance be established between 
economic development, natural development, and people.6 According to the World 
Commission on Dams (WCD), any dam project must aim to advance human development 
by satisfying economic development, social equity and environmental sustainability in 
order to deserve support from the international community.7 
The dam-declining era started when the debate over the effectiveness of big dams 
around the world was triggered by environmentalists who noted their adverse effects, 
including disrupting ecosystems, declining fisheries and the spread of disease.8 From the 
1980s through the 1990s, environmental transnational nongovernmental organizations 
increased dramatically and were dedicated to affecting the outcomes of dam 
development.9 For example, in the United States, these organizations could challenge 
congressional water projects and compel policy change and reforms in their 
implementation. Moreover, future projects will be tied more to ecosystem restoration, and 
U.S. planners will take into account the economic benefits of water usage and 
environmental costs as constraints in the planning process.10 Additionally, at the 
international level, the World Bank pulled out from funding a number of water project 
agreements as a result of facing charges from the organizations for failing to consider 
human health and the environmental costs of the water projects.11 
                                                 
6 Peter Ashton, “Water and Development: A Southern African Development Perspective,” in 
Managing Water Resources Past and Present: The Linacre Lectures 2002, edited. by Julie Trottier and 
Paul Slack (Oxford University Press, 2002), 161. 
7 World Commission on Dams (WCD), Dams and Development, 2. 
8 Stefanie Joyce, “Is It Worth a Dam?” Environmental Health Perspectives, 105, no. 10 (October 
1997), 1051. 
9 Khagram, Dams and Development, 12 (Table 1.1). 
10 Martin Reuss, “The Development of American Water Resources: Planners, Politicians, and 
Constitutional Interpretation,” in Managing Water Resources Past and Present: The Linacre Lectures 
2002, ed.  Julie Trottier and Paul Slack (Oxford University Press, 2002),  66–68. 
11 Joyce, “Is It Worth a Dam?” 1051. 
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Along with environmentalists, sociologists began to play an important role in the 
planning process of water projects. This became obvious by the directives and the 
revision of policies on the resettlement of indigenous people affected by large dams, and 
adopted by their largest financier, the World Bank. 12 As a follow-up to the 
environmental concerns in the United States, great consideration has been given to the 
concerns of ethnic minorities, the inarticulate, and the poor, whose physical habitats and 
livelihoods have been lost for the sake of national economic development.13 According to 
the WCD, 40 to 80 million people have faced physical displacement as a result of large 
dam constructions around the world. The exact number cannot be estimated accurately, as 
nations have a tendency to underestimate the number of displaced, and those who have 
the right to resettlement are also underestimated by 47 %. Most importantly,  and beyond  
displacement, the participation of those who would be affected in the planning process 
and implementation of dam projects, including resettlement and compensation, is mostly 
ignored, leading to migration and impoverishment.14 
Without losing track of development effectiveness framed by environmental and 
social costs, the debate has recently risen in a holistic manner, traversing even national 
boundaries. The debate not only refers to issues concerning gaps between the promises 
and goals of large dams and facts on the ground, but it also involves issues of economic 
recovery as well as regional development choices.15 This latter takes on significance 
when it comes to sharing river systems among neighboring countries and when disputes 
arise over issues related to the allocation of water, dam construction, water quality, and 
diversion schemes. The Euphrates-Tigris Basin is considered one of the contested trans-




                                                 
12 World Commission on Dams (WCD), Dams and Development, 18. 
13 Reuss, “The Development of American Water Resources: Planners, Politicians, and Constitutional 
Interpretation,” 68. 
14 World Commission on Dams (WCD), Dams and Development, 104–108. 
15 World Commission on Dams (WCD), Dams and Development, 21–23. 
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sources of friction among the three states are related to dam construction, water quality 
and allocation of waters. Moreover, several times, these disputes have led to interstate 
threats of war.16 
In that vein and at the international level, water development, supply and 
management have been among the most important political issues of the European 
Community since the 1990s.17 The main focus of the European Union, on issues related 
to water, is dealing with the mitigation of the negative impacts of water resources 
development.18 In doing so, the EU has provided guidelines and policies for water 
development that can be implemented at river basin levels in pursuit of conflict 
prevention and trans-boundary co-operation between states and sustainable river basin 
management.19 Summarizing some of these guidelines/policies, according to Article 4, 
environmental objectives have to be satisfied, resulting in a “good status” by the year 
2015. Article 3 prompts EU member states to identify the river basins lying in their 
national territory and adopt a cooperative approach and to coordinate in common, to deal 
with ecological status, the quality and quantity status of their basin water within the 
context of integrated water resource management. Finally, Article 14 stipulates the 
necessity for   “public participation” of all stakeholders affected by the process and 
implementation of the EU water policy.20 This latter takes great significance when it 
comes to those people displaced by water development projects who have no say in the 
planning process. In 1992, the United Nations (UN) Conference on Environment and 
Development declared twenty-seven principles (Rio Principles) directly relating to water 
resources management. Most of the principles are human-centric and recognize the 
                                                 
16 Institute of National Security Strategies (INSS), “Energy and Environmental Insecurity,” in Global 
Strategic Assessment 2009 (INSS, 2009), 88. 
17 Maria Kaika, “Water for Europe: The Creation of the European Water Framework Directive,” in 
Managing Water Resources Past and Present: The Linacre Lectures 2002, ed. Julie Trottier and Paul Slack 
(Oxford University Press, 2002), 109. 
18 Aysegul Kibaroglu, “Analysis of the Integrated Water Resources Management Approach: Turkey-
EU Water Relations as A Case-study,” (May 31, 2008), 5.  
19 Murray Biedler, “Hydropolitics of the Tigris-Euphrates River basin With Implications for the 
European Union,” Centre Europeen de Recherche Internationale et Strategique (CERIS), Research Papers 
No. 1 (2004), 30–31. 
20 Kibaroglu, “Analysis of the Integrated Water Resources Management Approach,” 5. 
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irremovable human right of living in harmony with nature integrated in a sustainable 
developmental process, the right of indigenous people to participate in such development, 
and a state’s liability to ensure compensation for victims of environmental damage.21 
At first glance, the UN constitutes a supplementary component of the EU water 
policy at the very local level of human rights within the frame of the sustainable 
development of water projects. while the EU moves at a more international level. The 
link of “public participation,” however, connects both organizations to cover the whole 
aspect of water development.  
This “diversification” is explained, based on the EU mission, within its context of 
enlargement. The EU perceives, as a global challenge for security, competition over 
natural resources, especially water, which is likely to bring turbulence in many regions.22 
The EU’s main goal is to bring together its twenty-seven members with twelve southern 
Mediterranean countries in an area where peace, prosperity and security are established. 
This aim is being realized with EU engagement in solving the water-related issues 
between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians by promoting and encouraging the joint 
undertaking of water-related projects for building peace in the area.23 
In 1999, the EU decided to include Turkey in its enlargement list by elevating it 
from the status of the applicant to that of a candidate member of the EU, which means 
that the EU intends to extend its borders towards a region riddled with tension and 
problems.24 On the other hand, Turkey has to take over the responsibility of aligning 
itself to EU directives by implementing appropriate political and economic reforms for 
obtaining full membership.25 In regard to the EU’s water policy, Turkey faces a great 
                                                 
21 World Commission on Dams (WCD), Dams and Development, 201–202. 
22 Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World-The European Security Strategy,” in European 
Development Policy Confronting New Challenges in Foreign and Security Policy, International Conference 
(Berlin: November 23, 2004), 53. 
23 Annika Kramer, “Regional Water Cooperation and Peace Building in the Middle East: Regional 
Case Study, Middle East,” Initiative for Peace Building (EU) (December 2008), introduction.  
24 Commission of the European Communities, “Issue Arising from Turkey’s Membership 
Perspective,” Commission Staff Working Document (Brussels: October 2004), 7. 
25 Ayse B. Celik, “Transnationalization of Human Rights Norms and Its Impact on Internally 
Displaced Kurds,” Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 3 (August 2005), 987.  
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challenge in the Euphrates-Tigris basin with the downstream states—Syria and Iraq—in 
terms of initiating a cooperative approach to resolving their accrued water-related 
problems resulting from a water development project Turkey began in the basin in the 
1980s. Moreover, Turkey is facing a far greater challenge in the issue of human rights for 
the Internally Displaced People (IDP) in Turkey (Kurds in their majority), after a rather 
negative criticism—launched in 2004—by the European Commission (EC) on their 
resettlement progress. Even though the EC does not discriminate between IDPs, as a 
result of the military conflict between the Turkish army and PKK insurgents and IDPs as 
a result of water development projects, it embraces both categories as the principles 
stipulate, and refers to the same region of Turkey—Southeastern Anatolia.  
From the above discourse, it is clear that Turkey faces a great challenge in 
obtaining full membership in the EU, within the framework of water cooperation in the 
basin and human rights.  
At the national and regional level of Southeastern Anatolia, the waters of the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers have been exploited through the construction of small and 
large dams with ambiguous results in the region, thus validating the debate on the 
effectiveness and sustainability of large-scale water development projects. 
Specifically, Turkey has launched an integrated regional development project 
(GAP),26 which covers investments in dams, power plants, agricultural irrigation 
schemes, urban and rural infrastructure, industry, transportation, education, health, 
housing, and tourism.27  
The initial stage of the GAP, in the 1960s and 1970s, put its primary emphasis on 
hydroelectric power generation due to the increased national demand for electricity.28 By 
1989, the GAP Master Plan’s development scenario shifted its emphasis to transforming 
the rural Southeastern Anatolia region into an export base for its agricultural products.29 
                                                 
26 GAP name comes from the Turkish acronym, Gunaydyn Anadolu Projesi. 
27 Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report,” General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, 2009, 
36. 
28 Servet Mutlu, “The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) of Turkey: its Context, Objectives and 
Prospects,” Orient 37, no. 1 (1996b), 59. 
29 I. H. Olcay Unver, “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” Water Resources Development 13, no. 4 
(1997), 460. 
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An increase in agricultural production contributed to infrastructural development, and 
increased economic activities and agro-related industries and services.30 As of 2006, the 
GAP sought to increase the income levels and living standards of people (a majority of 
whom are Kurdish) living in the region, to remove inter-regional development disparities 
and to contribute to the nationwide goals of economic development and social stability.31  
The ultimate aim of the project (GAP) is to ensure sustainable human 
development in the region; thus, dams and other physical infrastructure are necessary for 
economic growth.32 Upon completion of the project,  twenty-two dams and nineteen 
power plants will irrigate 1.8 million hectares of land (21% of Turkey’s total irrigable 
land), generate energy reaching 27.385 GWh (20% of its total energy potential), the 
region’s per capita income will rise 209%, and 3.8 million jobs will be created.33  
On the other hand, the Southeastern Anatolia rural region has been neglected 
since 1923; thus, the increased poverty level provided a suitable environment for 
recruitment by the secessionist movement Worker’s Party of Kurdistan (PKK), which has 
been engaged in armed clashes with Turkish troops in the region since 1984.34 
Additionally, this region has demonstrated a demographic explosion, coupled with 
massive out-migration to the western cities of Turkey, as well as in-migration. These 
factors have exerted infrastructural pressure on both fronts.35 As of the 1990s, Turkey has 
attempted to solve her internal problems in terms of economic growth to alleviate poverty 
in the region through the implementation of the GAP project. Therefore, the GAP serves 
the purpose of creating economic growth and integrating the region, in an attempt to 
reverse the aforementioned problems by using a massive irrigation-hydroelectric 
infrastructure, which will utilize the land and the water of the region. However, the 
                                                 
30 Unver, “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” 461. 
31Republic of Turkey, “Latest Situation on Southeastern Anatolia Project: Activities of the GAP 
Administration,” Regional Development Administration (RDA) (June 2006), 1. 
32Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report 2009,” General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works 
(DSI), 2009, 38–39. 
33 Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report 2009,” 38. 
34 Mutlu, “The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) of Turkey: its Context, Objectives and 
Prospects,” Orient 37, no. 1 (1996b), 59. 
35 Mutlu, “The Southeastern Anatolia Project,” 60. 
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implementation of the GAP has raised tension in the region’s basin, which is made up of 
Syria and Iraq as well, because of the effects of the GAP on the environment and the 
socioeconomic interests of the downstream states. This tension did not evade 
international attention, as it carried the potential for political and armed conflict in the 
Middle East region.36Additionally, it has attracted the scrutiny of the EU concerning the 
resettlement of the internally displaced people in Turkey within the framework of its full 
membership.  
Both aforementioned issues have been reported in a negative way by the Kurdish 
side, which represents the direct stakeholder in Southeastern Anatolia, where the GAP 
project is supposed to bring development. In particular, the Kurdish side claims that the 
GAP is controversial in terms of socioeconomic development and political implications, 
both domestically and internationally. The construction of dams in the Southeastern 
Anatolia provinces constitute just another form of forced displacement that Kurdish 
populations met during the civil war in the mid-1980s to late 1990s. 37 The project is far 
from improving the level of wellness, peace and happiness of the citizens of the region, 
and in its current state, will cause instability internally and in the region. The Kurdish 
side brings up the Ilisu Dam issue, which is representative of the displacement of local 
people and of the tension it will cause, as it will reduce the flow of water towards Syria 
and Iraq, thus causing alleged conflict in the region. 
To sum up poising the GAP project in the above discussion, the project faces 
multiple challenges internationally and domestically. At the international level, the 
effectiveness of the large-scale water projects is debatable, according to WCD. At the 
same time and within the frame of human sustainable development, the issue of displaced 
people as a side effect of dams has been a great concern by the UN and currently by the 
EU. At the national level, the Kurdish side is not in agreement with the Turkish state in 
regard to the outcomes of the GAP project. 
In that light, the scope of this thesis is to assess the progress of the GAP project in 
the above issues. Therefore, the thesis aims at assessing the GAP in terms of agriculture 
                                                 
36 Mutlu, “The Southeastern Anatolia Project,” 59. 
37 “Turkey’s GAP and its Impact in the Region,” Kurdish Herald 1 no. 5 (September 2009). 
 9
and energy advances, as well as on the human welfare status in Southeastern Anatolia in 
regard to the goals and objectives of the project and also its challenge to meet EU criteria 
for Turkey’s accession to EU.  
Therefore, the major research question the thesis will attempt to answer is: 
How far has the GAP project progressed in meeting its objectives in the 
agriculture-energy sector and the socioeconomic development of the Southeastern 
Anatolia region as well as the EU criteria on regional stability and human rights? 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
A first hypothesis is that adverse climate change will negatively affect the water 
quantity of the basin, and coupled with the construction of large-scale dams that facilitate 
evaporation and transpiration, the water quantity will be further reduced. 
A second hypothesis is that the growing population in Turkey, Syria and Iraq as 
well as the degree of dependence on the agriculture sector for food security, will increase 
the demand for domestic water consumption and irrigation practices, a trend not 
consistent with the extensive irrigation programs in Southeastern Anatolia and Syria. 
A problem is that there is no precise census regarding the issue of the population 
making up the Southeastern Anatolia region of Turkey. The area is inhabited by Turk, 
Arab and Kurd ethnicities, of which Kurds are the majority. According to a 1990 
estimation, 64.98%38 of the populations in Southeastern Anatolia are Kurds, but this 
figure has probably changed, as during the period 1990–1999, roughly one million Kurds 
fled the region as a result of the civil war between the Turkish army and the PKK 
insurgency. Therefore, it is difficult to demonstrate the magnitude of the effect of the 
GAP project, in terms of macro and micro indicators, on Kurdish populations.   
Finally, and of great significance, is the problem regarding the validation of 
collected information and statistical data to construct the macroeconomic indicators for 
the examined period 2001 onwards. The same concern has been stated in the theses 
                                                 
38 Servet Mutlu, “Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study,” International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 28, no. 4 (November 1996), 533 (Table 3). 
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mentioned in the literature review for the period 1990–2000. This thesis is faced with the 
difficulty of collecting updated information from the Turkish Institute of State Statistics 
on critical macroeconomic indicators. Most of these are referring to 2000, while 
indicators of no such significance are up to date.  However, the thesis proceeds by 
providing cross-checked sources. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The WCD was established as an NGO in 1998, and after a two-year intensive 
study of several large dams, portrayed in its 2000 report the fact that large dams and 
complex water projects met their goals to a lesser percent than had been anticipated. On 
the other hand, ecology degradation, poor performance and displaced people, due to 
construction, were the impacts of large dams. WCD’s report has no data or evidence 
related to the performance of the GAP project. 
Though minimal, the literature related to the GAP project can be divided into two 
main categories: the academic literature on GAP-related issues and the literature 
consisting of theses and dissertations. The major difference between the two categories is 
that the first category presents mainly scattered information on the agricultural, energy, 
socioeconomic and regional water-related issues that the GAP projects are involved in, 
covering a time frame from 1985 up to now. The latter category focuses on the 
socioeconomic achievements of the GAP project from the economic regional 
development and human sustainability perspective, and secondarily at the regional level. 
Moreover, this category was written in 2001 through 2008, but refers to the period from 
1990 through 2002. Even with both sets of literature, there are scant sources to present all 
the issues the GAP project issues is involved in, and what there is highlights mostly the 
period from 1990–1996.  
In regard to the issue of Turkey’s accession to the EU, and its connection to the 
GAP project, there is one thesis from the literature category that touches upon the issue of 
human rights by using the case of the Ilisu Dam. 
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The academic literature can be further broken down into three sub-categories. The 
first explores the impact of the GAP at the international level. The second presents the 
evolutionary aspect of the project and problems that must be resolved in regard to its 
goals. The third category refers generally to the negative impact of the GAP, focusing on 
the Ilisu Dam as a case study.  
The first sub-category views the GAP project from the perspective of 
international relations between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, which all make up the Euphrates 
Basin. In this light, the scholarship approaches the GAP project from the aspect of water 
disputes, wars on water sharing, and states’ unilateral actions, as well as negotiation and 
internal-regional security. In the Euphrates Basin, it is argued that the GAP project has 
launched a “Hydro-Jihad” between the three countries as they are contesting the 
allotment of Euphrates water.39 Unilateral actions taken to harness Euphrates water by 
the three countries have led to water conflicts, as these actions have had adverse impacts 
on downstream countries; Syria is downstream from Turkey and Iraq downstream from 
Syria.40  
The aspect of negotiation presents immediate interest as it connects power, 
strategic and security issues. The GAP project is presented as giving the advantage of 
power to Turkey, while the vulnerable downstream countries, as counterweight strategies, 
use national interests affected by the GAP. In the case of Syria, the PKK issue is being 
used to exert pressure on Turkey in regard to water quantities.41  In the PKK issue, there 




                                                 
39 Vandana Shiva, Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution and Profit (South End Press, 2002), 71. 
40Miriam R. Lowi, Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin 
(Cambridge University Press, 1993), 57. 
41Marwa Daoudy, “Asymmetric Power: Negotiating Water in the Euphrates and Tigris,” International 
Negotiation 14, no 2 (Nijhoff, 2009), 361–362. 
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issue in the broader frame of Turkey’s attitude towards Arab states.42 Also, Syria exerted 
a veto in the financing of the GAP project due to the water pollution that extensive 
irrigation activities in Turkey have caused.43 
The second sub-category includes an evaluation of the international aspect of the 
GAP, but the main focus is on the GAP’s goals and achievements.  
A unique, detailed and holistic scientific study of the GAP project in terms of 
technical details of the major dams of the project, financing, geological, hydrological and 
water scarcity considerations at the international level, is given by Kolars and Mitchell. 
They focus on the sectors of agriculture and industry in the region and nation, and give 
their perspective on future prospects of the GAP project. They leave a scent of optimism 
for the success of the project. However, they have predicted delays in progress and that 
less land will be irrigated than originally planned. They also suggest that the agricultural 
sector will be the most profitable if modern mechanized methods of irrigation and 
selection of the least water-consuming crops are used.44 Their study is well substantiated 
but, as they state in their book, they have encountered many problems with gathering 
accurate data, which are as old as 1980–1988. They do not make any reference to the 
energy sectors of the project. 
Two important studies conducted in 1996 and 1995, respectively, examine the 
potential of the GAP project from different perspectives and conclude different results. 
First, both studies address the issue of the viability of the GAP project in relation to its 
goals stated in the master plan.  
The first study focuses on the bleak viability of the agricultural sector, as there are 
serious problems—such as on-farm training, land distribution, erosion, siltation and 
                                                 
42 Jack Kalpakian, Identity, Conflict and Cooperation in the International River Systems (Ashgate, 
2004), 97. 
43 G. E. Gruen, “Turkish Waters: Source of Regional Conflict or catalyst for Peace?” Water, Air, and 
Soil Pollution 123 (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 517. 
44 John Kolars and William A. Mitchell, The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Project 
(Southern Illinois University, 1991), 260. 
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salinization—that must be overcome.45 Then it goes on to the need for capital flow and a 
strong administration to take on such a large project, and concludes, in turn, with the lack 
of agreement between the riparian countries on the allocation of water.46  
The second study touches on the same topics of agriculture and financial cost, but 
it examines the socioeconomic aspect of the Kurdish populations in the area of the GAP. 
In particular, it argues that the social structure of the Kurds cannot be integrated or 
culturally assimilated through the strategy of the socioeconomic integration of the 
GAP.47 On the other hand, the study argues that the GAP has the potential in agriculture, 
industry and urbanization sectors to improve the economy of Southeastern Anatolia.48 
Contrastingly, the two studies contradict each other on the issue of the viability of the 
agriculture sector, and neither one mentions the prospects of the energy sector, which is 
the second pillar of the GAP.  
These two complementary studies lead to contradictory results in regard to the 
impacts of the GAP project. The major study of Mitchell and Kolars seems to settle in the 
middle, as it presents the GAP with conditional optimism. 
The third sub-category is all engulfing, with a special interest in the Ilisu Dam, 
even though the dam is not representative of the whole GAP project. 
This part of the scholarship points out the environmental, economic, social and 
political impacts of the GAP project by using, as its case study, the Ilisu Dam, which for 
decades has been highly controversial at both the domestic and international levels for the 
above reasons. There is consensus on the following set of issues. The primary motivation 
of the GAP is to economically relieve the unhappy minority of Southeastern Anatolia.49 
Also, Turkey is under pressure to develop her resources to reduce her foreign deficit and 
                                                 
45 Mutlu, “The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) of Turkey: its Context, Objectives and 
Prospects,” Orient 37, no. 1 (1996b), 71–75. 
46 Mutlu, “The Southeastern Anatolia Project,” 75–82. 
47 Carl E. Nestor, “Dimensions of Turkey’s Kurdish Question and the Potential Impact of the 
Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” The International Journal of Kurdish Studies. 8, no. 1 (1995), 34–
35. 
48 Nestor, “Dimensions of Turkey’s Kurdish Question,” 78. 
49 Kalpakian, Identity, Conflict and Cooperation, 97–102. 
 14
mitigate political instability in the region by improving the living status.50 The GAP has 
not borne the anticipated regional economic and social development.51 The Ilisu Dam 
will flood Kurdish villages, thus exacerbating the relations between the state and the 
Kurds.52 There is need for an overall review and precise assessment on the economic, 
ecological and social problems of the GAP and, in particular, of the Ilisu Dam.53 The 
scholarship is lacking detailed evidence in all the above-mentioned problems. Also, the 
agricultural performance of the GAP is not mentioned and the energy sector is treated as 
an overview of Turkey’s energy demands. 
In the second category of literature, the GAP project is judged as environmentally 
and socially unsustainable on the basis that the soil supposed to provide food to local 
farmers is being destroyed, due to accruing salt as a result of the irrigation of the GAP 
project.54 
The next two theses are complementary to each other as they focus on the 
economic aspect of the GAP project by examining macroeconomic indicators such as 
GDP, GDP per capita, industry and trade and microeconomic factors such as 
infrastructure, services and socio-demographic indicators. However, their approach is 
different, as one examines the project at the regional level and the other by using 
economic indices: Theil inequality and Gini coefficient. Both findings, covering mainly 
the period from 1987 through 2001, agree that the relative economic development of the 
Southeastern region, compared to Turkey as a nation, has not improved. Even though 
there is improvement in absolute numbers, there is still intraregional economic inequality. 
Their conclusions sound optimistic, as both predict that at the regional level, the relative 
                                                 
50 John Kolars and William A. Mitchell, The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Project 
(Southern Illinois University, 1991), 17. 
51 Ercan Ayboga, “Report About the Impacts of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) and the Ilisu 
Dam on the Downstream Countries Iraq and Syria,” Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive (August 25, 2009).  
52 Fikret Adaman and Murat Arsel, Environmentalism in Turkey: Between Democracy and 
Development? (Ashgate, 2005), 7. 
53 Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), “Sustainable Management of International Rivers; 
Case Study: Southeastern Anatolia Project in Turkey, GAP,” Center for International Studies (Zurich, 
2001), 1–35. 
54 Nilay Ayguney, “Burdens of ‘Development’ in Southeastern Turkey: Salinization and Socio-
cultural Disruption” (Thesis, Lund University, 2002), 2. 
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economic disparity will be reduced55, however, the social aspect of the project has been 
neglected, which means the project marked only economic success on a macro level for 
the above period of time.56 
The next pair of theses presents the Turkish aspect of the GAP project on the 
international level within the context of transboundary water resources management. 
Specifically, one thesis examines the GAP project within the frame of conflict over the 
water between Turkey, Syria and Iraq as a result of domestic policies and the concerns of 
the states, and not on the basis of a water shortage in the basin. The thesis concludes that 
the GAP project strained the tensions between Turkey and Syria but not between Turkey 
and Iraq, and because the domestic concerns of the states are similar, the only way out of 
the conflict is to cooperate in water management on an integrated regional basis.57 
Similarly, the second thesis examines the GAP project at the same international level, but 
within the frame of poor interstate relations in the basin and their adverse impact on the 
GAP project. This thesis takes the Ataturk and Ilisu Dams as case studies to support its 
argument.58Neither thesis elaborates on the progress of the agriculture or energy sectors 
of the GAP project. The first thesis accepts that remarkable achievements have been 
reached, but the project lags behind in improving living standards in the region.59 The 
second one, even though it mentions the socioeconomic aspect of the project, states that 
this issue cannot be quantified or put to the success/failure test. However, the thesis’s 
overall impression is positive about the success of the project for the last three decades, 
                                                 
55 Ahenk Dereli, “Regional Development and Impacts of Regional Development Projects in the Light 
of ‘New Economic Geography’ and Firm Heterogeneity: The Case of Southeastern Anatolia Project 
(GAP)” (Thesis, Aarhus University, 2008), 63. 
56 Sibel S. Toybiyik, “The Impact of the Southeastern Anatolia Project on the Inter-Regional 
Inequalities in Turkey” (Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2003), 125–131. 
57 Salih Korkutan, “The Sources of Conflict in The Euphrates-Tigris Basin and Its Strategic 
Consequences in the Middle East” (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School University, 2001), 84–87.  
58 Ahmet Ozturk, “Management of Transboundary mega-projects in the post-Cold War Eurasia: The 
case studies of GAP water and Baku-Ceyhan pipeline projects” (PhD diss., Keele University, 2006), 226–
245. 
59 Ozturk, “Management of Transboundary mega-projects in the post-Cold War Eurasia,” 47. 
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but it leaves a scent of pessimism for the years to come, unless Turkey adopts a more 
flexible approach towards domestic and international concerns.60 
The last thesis examines the GAP project in the period 1990–2000, within the 
context of sustainable development and Kurdish human rights, concluding that Middle 
East stability depends on these two issues.61 I separate this thesis from the rest for its 
uniqueness on touching upon the resettlement issue in the Ilisu case and the impact on 
Turkey’s accession to the EU.62 The thesis accepts that the GAP project has brought a 
broad agricultural boom, though not all Kurds are benefitting from it, while predicting 
that the agriculture sector will be further diminished in the future, without providing any 
proof.63 
Taking all the theses together, the general impression is that the GAP project for 
the period 1990–2000 has been successful in absolute economic terms, but not relative to 
Turkey’s economic indicators. The socioeconomic development of the people in the 
region lags behind, so far, and there is need for more comprehensive research. At the 
international level, the GAP project caused tensions among the states of the basin and 
negatively affected them in terms of further progress. The agriculture and energy sectors’ 
progress have not been the main focus of the theses, but in one case, which addressed the 
issue within the frame of the agriculture sector, in a very confined and strict way, stated 
that the salinization of the soil due to irrigation destroyed Kurdish livelihoods. In brief, 
the theses examined the GAP project in its broader objectives and in the early years of its 
operation, which is not fair. 
Concerning the issues of Turkey’s accession to the EU and the GAP project, the 
latter is addressed at the regional level of geopolitics as a factor amongst others, which 
may create turmoil in regional relations if it is used as a tool to stop the flow on the Tigris 
                                                 
60 Ozturk, “Management of Transboundary mega-projects in the post-Cold War Eurasia,” 326–328. 
61 Julia Hill, “The GAP and Human Rights: Turkey’s Successes and Conflicts with Sustainable 
Development in the Kurdish Region of Southeastern Anatolia” (Thesis, International Studies of Oregon 
University, 2006), 62. 
62 Hill, “The GAP and Human Rights,” 59. 
63 Hill, “The GAP and Human Rights,” 54–55. 
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and Euphrates Rivers.64 However, the bulk of the literature on the accession issue focuses 
on the political criteria known as the Copenhagen Criteria, and in particular, on human 
rights in Turkey. In that light, the GAP project is considered to be a top-down state-
centric approach to the socioeconomic issue of Southeastern Anatolia, with almost no 
link or say in the planning process, but budget allocations. Moreover, the bottom-up 
consensus, and consequently, public acceptance of the project, has not been achieved, 
which reflects the resistance of the population to participate.65 In 1999, Turkey was at the 
bottom of the applicant list for candidacy because of its poor record on human rights. 
Even though Turkey adopted reform packages in 2003, including issues related to the 
protection of ethnic minorities and human rights, there is still a gap between theory and 
practice.66 In 2004, a major breakthrough on human rights was reached when a famous 
political detainee was released and ethnic minority languages, including Kurdish, began 
to be broadcast.67 Despite the fact that Turkey tries to close the gap in meeting the 
criteria, it still faces the thorny issue of the Internally Displaced People (IDPs). So far, the 
Turkish state shows an inability to deal with the large numbers of IDPs coming from all 
the provinces of Southeastern Anatolia, predominantly Kurdish in terms of resettlement 
and compensation, a number that is aggravated by the GAP project.68 According to 
Kurdish sources from a fact-finding mission carried out in the Diyarbakir and Van 
provinces in Southeastern Anatolia, the number of IDPs who resettled and were 
compensated is low to non-existent.69 
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From the above discourse on the issue of human rights and Turkey’s accession to 
the EU, it becomes obvious that the Turkish state has taken serious steps toward human 
rights, but it does not fulfill the criteria yet, which in the future will complicate its full 
membership. In this literature, the issue of IDPs is addressed, but it lacks an analysis of 
the numbers displaced by the GAP project and general development projects.  
This research paper will attempt to assess the water development project (GAP) in 
the Southeastern Anatolia region in Turkey in all areas of its involvement, filling the gaps 
in the above literature. The period of time of its operation is fair enough—1989–2010—
to trigger an assessment with respect to its objectives at the local and national levels. 
Although the project has been implemented within the Turkish sovereignty, it seems that 
it has brought tension at the international level between the states making up the basin. 
Moreover, within the context of Turkey’s accession to EU, even though the project itself 
is not in the front line of criticism, it has its own share in the IDPs case, which the 
literature has not given enough insight. Therefore, an examination at the international 
level on the above issues, which are of EU concern, will complete its overall picture at all 
levels. 
In doing so, this thesis will assess the progress of the agriculture and energy 
sectors in respect to the set-up objectives at the local and national levels. Secondly, it will 
trace down the socioeconomic progress of Southeastern Anatolia by examining macro-
and micro-economic indicators with respect to the objectives as they are officially 
stipulated by the Turkish Republic through its responsible departments of GAP-RDA 
(GAP-Regional Directive Administration) and the Directorate of State Hydraulic Works 
(DSI). At this point, the paper will challenge the Turkish notion of “sustainability” in 
theory and practice as a supplementary task. Lastly, at the international level and within 
the framework of Turkey’s accession to the EU, the thesis will assesses the prospects of 
Turkey for full membership by examining the status of the regional stability of the basin, 
as well as the IDPs, and the role of the GAP project to that end. 
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D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis uses primarily secondary sources to frame its argument. The sources 
used to frame this thesis come mostly from secondary sources. Also, first-hand empirical 
studies conducted in the region are from multiple sources for cross-checking purposes in 
the agriculture assessment sector. Statistical data are used in the thesis from the Turkish 
Statistical Institute and other sources for cross-checking, to construct economic data in a 
logical way due to the lack of updated data. Fact-finding missions’ results are used, 
though they span a ten-year period of time without providing updates on the latest 
situation. However, to carry out an expeditionary mission in the Southeastern Anatolia 
region is not easy due to the Turkish state’s constraints and the increased Turkish military 
presence, especially in the eastern parts of the region near the borders with Iraq.  
Also, in Chapter III, the thesis examines several dams in the GAP project: Keban, 
Karakaya, Ataturk, Birecik and Ilisu. These dams have significant importance because 
they were discussed at the international level. Moreover, the Ataturk and Ilisu Dams are 
still being discussed because they are the largest of the GAP project, and hence, their 
impacts are a long-term ongoing process even though they were completed in the 1990s, 
as was the Ataturk Dam. The Ilisu Dam is currently under construction and set to be 
completed by 2013, but it is the most internationally controversial of all the dams because 
of its negative impact on the local people and the environment. Lastly, the Keban Dam is 
not considered by the Turkish state to be part of the GAP project, although it was begun 
under that notion. However, since it lies in the Southeastern Anatolia region, it has it still 
has an impact on the region.  
Throughout the thesis, the comparative method is widely used, as it is the best 
method for tracking actual effectiveness and discourse on the GAP project. 
In addition to the books, articles, theses and dissertations were used to develop the 
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II. AGRICULTURE AND ENERGY EVALUATION OF  
THE GAP PROJECT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Within the context of assessing the GAP project, this thesis challenges the 
viability of the agricultural and energy sectors of the project, and their contribution to 
Turkey’s GDP growth on a long-term basis, by giving a comparative analysis of these 
two sectors, as well as some prospects for potential progress.  
In this light, the primary objective of the GAP project, which is to bring 1.8 
million hectares under irrigation in the Southeastern Anatolia region of Turkey, is not 
feasible, which undermines not only the success of the project, but also renders 
unrealistic the GAP Master Plan for development to transform the region into an export 
base for its agricultural products.70 Secondly, the major crop, cotton, currently the base of 
boosting the agriculture in the region, cannot be sustained for a number of reasons. This 
is of paramount importance, as the calculated increase of agricultural production due to 
the GAP project contributes to infrastructural development and an increased economy in 
the region.71 A possible stagnation in cotton production or resorting to an alternative crop 
production may impose stagnation on the manufacturing industry or create the need for a 
fresh infrastructure to cope with the issue of achieving the desired economic development 
in the region. The economic development to be reached through irrigation and energy 
production been calculated to produce a rise in the per capita income of 209% and 
employment opportunities for 3.8 million people.72 The analysis of the agricultural 
sector, that follows, makes an assessment of the prospects for further progress by 
outlining the limited options to that end.  
                                                 
70 Unver, “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” Water Resources Development 13, no. 4 (1997), 
460. 
71 Unver, “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” 461. 
72 Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report 2009,” General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works 
(DSI) (2009), 38. 
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In regard to the energy sector, the primary objective of the GAP project is to 
produce 7,490 MW or 27,387 GWh of electrical power by exploiting the Euphrates-
Tigris water through Hydro-Electrical Power Plant dams (HEPPs). This sector is the most 
important from the perspective of meeting Turkey’s ever-growing energy demands. 
Additionally, the GAP hydro-plants in Southeastern Anatolia are more profitable 
compared to the agricultural sector in the comparative case to be made at the conclusion 
of this chapter. However, the energy sector of the GAP project is viable for a medium 
time period, as the capability of exploiting the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris are 
finite, which means the GAP, in the passage of time, will not keep up with the 
accelerating energy demands of Turkey in the long run.  
Taking the sectors together, the agricultural sector will continue to lag behind, 
with respect to the energy sector, in terms of realization, with the energy sector being 
more profitable. The agricultural sector is not likely to increase its realization rate and 
reach its goal as a consequence of the multiple problems it has to deal with.. The energy 
sector will be completed first as it is closing in on its full realization; however, the 
exploitation of the basin’s water for electricity production has a medium-term horizon. 
After that, the sector will no longer be adequate to keep up with the nation’s energy 
demands.  
B. A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKEY’S 
AGRICULTURE SECTOR CONTRIBUTION TO GNP (1923–2009) AND 
THE GAP PROJECT  
The agricultural sector has displayed a rather diminishing historical development 
trend in contributing to the nation’s GNP since the declaration of Turkey’s independence 
in 1923. It is a sort of paradox to expect that the GAP project, in the Southeastern 
Anatolia region of its application, will boost agricultural production in order to contribute 
nationwide goals of economic development,73 given the diminishing trend of the sector. 
The period 1923–1946 was characterized by a development strategy to improve 
infrastructure and industry in line with Western standards. Then Turkey followed a 
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strategy of increased focus on agriculture and mechanization of the sector during 1946–
59, which was followed by a period of mixed economic strategy of import substitution, 
financial liberalization and export-oriented growth until 1997.74 In general, in the 
aforementioned period, Turkey displayed a tendency to move away from being 
agriculturally reliant and rural-based, to being increasingly more industrialized and 
urbanized, as will be discussed in the third chapter.75 In particular, in 1923, the 
agricultural sector contributed to the GNP growth by 43%, while in 1997 the contribution 
was reduced to 13%.76 The same trend continued until the year 2007, with a further 
reduction of 11%.77 The latest statistics given, for the year 2008, project that the sector 
contributes to the GNP by 8.9%.78 It should be noted that the GAP project was officially 
established with a Master Plan in 1989, and it has been performing from 1994 until the 
present time. According to the above statistics, from the period 1997–2008, it seems that 
the diminishing trend of the sector did not reverse despite the implementation of the GAP 
project.  
However, statistics sometimes play tricks on the real situation. After 1997, the 
GNP experienced a significant increase; in 1997, the GNP measured up to $363 billion. 
For the years 2007 and 2008, the GNP accounted for $708 billion and $755 billion, 
respectively.79 The broadening of the gap between agricultural contribution and GNP 
growth means the sector lags steadily behind. This fact may be interpreted to mean that 
GNP growth is due to the productivity of other sectors. For example, the jump in 1997’s 
GNP to almost double in 2007 is not justified as a major contribution of the agriculture 
sector; the mean average per year growth of the sector is 3.1%, while the annual growth 
of the GNP for the same period is roughly 9%, as it comes out of the 1997 and 2008 
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percentages. Moreover, Turkey has not officially announced her 2009 GNP, which is 
projected to be down, compared to 2008’s, by 24.3% to approximately $552.2 billion, 
due to the global economic downturn.80 It remains to be seen what percentage of the 
agricultural sector will be in the 2009 GNP. It is argued, in an analogy to the above 
statistics, that the sector should be estimated to present a further reduced contribution to 
2009’s GNP.  
In sum, what becomes obvious from the above examination is that the agricultural 
sector, on a yearly basis since 1963, demonstrates a steady annual growth of a rough 
mean average of 3%, and at the same time, Turkey’s GNP from 1997 onwards galloped 
at a rough annual pace of 9%. Moreover, the GAP project, for the examined period 1997–
2008, did not display any change, either in the average agriculture growth or in the GNP. 
Therefore, the diminishing role of agriculture in the nation’s GNP growth becomes 
evident. However, it does not mean that agricultural production in the currently irrigated 
land in the GAP region has not seen substantial increase compared to the pre-GAP 
implementation years, though it has reached a plateau due to problems analyzed further 
down.  
C. AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN THE GAP REGION 
As to the GAP project, it must bring into irrigation 1.8 million hectares, as the 
irrigation has the direct result of substantially increasing agricultural production.81 
However, since 1994, the project has demonstrated few advances in the physical 
realization of irrigation results, and at the same time, problems that inhibit agricultural 
production. These problems are related to salinity, continuous irrigation, climate change, 
and water scarcity. The latter has extreme importance for the international relations of the 
states making up the Euphrates-Tigris Basin—Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. The more water 
Turkey extracts for irrigation by impounding water behind the dams of the GAP project, 
the less Syria and Iraq receive. Chapter IV explains in detail the conflict among the states 
on the international level as a result of the GAP project. 
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The potential land area that Turkey could exploit economically by irrigation 
methods reaches 8.5 million hectares; thus, the GAP project applies to 21% of this land.82 
As of 2008, 5.28 million hectares of the total potential land had already been irrigated, 
and by the year 2023, the rest is anticipated to be developed.83 In 1994, in the GAP 
region, 135,000 hectares were under irrigation and another 200,000 hectares were being 
prepared to receive irrigation.84 In 1998, the total irrigation scheme reached 174,080 
hectares, which means, if compared with the year 1995, from the planned 200,000 
hectares in 1994 only 39,000 hectares were brought under irrigation.85 Until 2006, 
236,019 hectares of land were brought under irrigation in the region, while 142,099 
hectares were under construction in irrigation schemes. The physical realization of GAP 
irrigation investments was 13.7 % as of the end of 2005.86 In 2009, the realization of the 
irrigation scheme advanced to 15%87 or 270,000 hectares. The slow pace of the GAP 
irrigation scheme, during the period 1998–2009, is due to specific factors that present 
serious problems for further realization of the project, and which may put the whole 
project into jeopardy.  
Further down, on explaining the adverse effects of these factors on the sector, it is 
argued that the full-scale realization of the irrigation plan may not be feasible. This 
assessment is very important because irrigating less land will secure more water for Syria 
and Iraq, who are complaining about the dwindling Euphrates water flow due to Turkey’s 
intervention with dam constructions on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. On the other 
hand, the diminution of the irrigated land in the agriculture sector—the main pillar on 
                                                 
82 Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report 2009,” General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works 
(DSI) (2009), 39. 
83 Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report 2009,” 25. 
84 Unver, “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” 464. 
85 Mehmet Tomanbay, “Turkey’s Water Potential and the Southeast Anatolia Project,” in Water 
Balances in the Eastern Mediterranean, ed. David B. Brooks and Ozay Mehmet (International 
Development Research Center, 2000),  12. 
86 Republic of Turkey, “Latest Situation on Southeastern Anatolia Project: Activities of the GAP 
Administration,” Regional Development Administration Report (June 2006), 4. 
87 Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report 2009,” 39. 
 26
which economic development will be brought to Southeastern Anatolia—will moderate 
the optimism for a tremendous economic boost in the area.  
Irrigation of the GAP project has to deal with the major challenge of the salinity 
problem in the most promising area in terms of agricultural production, the Harran plains. 
The largest part of the irrigation project takes place in the Euphrates basin, which 
accounts for roughly 1.1 million hectares, while the Tigris basin accounts for .7 million 
hectares.88 In the Euphrates basin, a pilot irrigation project commenced in 1994 in the 
Harran plains. These plains are in proximity to the city of Sanliurfa, where the largest 
dam of the GAP complex, the Ataturk Dam, provides water supply through two 24.6 km-
long tunnel systems to the Harran plains for irrigation.89  
The significance of these plains rests in the results of agricultural production due 
to irrigation from the dam. Before the new irrigation method from the dam, the land used 
for crop production in 1994 was 30,000 hectares, while after irrigation it expanded to 
53,420 hectares in 1995. This expansion of irrigated land was accompanied by a 
substantial increase in cotton production, from 21% in 1994 to 45% in 1995. Moreover, 
the production value rose from $32 million to $120.6 million in just one year.90 
On the other hand, all waters used in irrigation contain dissolved salts.91 The salts 
accumulate in the soil and poison the root zones of the crops. To flush away the salts, 
more water is needed, but the excess water still contains salt, so it tends to salinize the 
groundwater and raise the water table. The more water used, the more saline the ground 
becomes, and as the water table rises, there is the risk of salty waterlogging, which can 
destroy an entire region’s irrigation-based agriculture.92 The Sumerians, who lived in this 
region, had a salinization problem. Evaporating water left behind layers of salt, and rising 
water tables brought more salt to the surface. One solution to the problem was to leave 
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lands unwatered for many seasons, to let the water table fall and let rain wash the salt 
down far below the surface. But this would have taken years, so it was not done, and 
consequently all the crops withered, bringing the Sumerians to the brink of starvation and 
no inability to fight invaders.93 
Turkish Advanced Soil Map surveys report that salinity was detected on 
1,518,722 hectares of the national land resource, which constitutes a roughly 28.7% of 
the 5.28 million hectares of already economically irrigable land. Salinity in the GAP area 
also was detected, and in particular, in the Harran Plain.94 The plain is the largest in the 
GAP region and covers 141,500 hectares of irrigable land. The area has shown a 
propensity to salinity even before the initiation of the irrigation project. In 1987, the total 
salinized area was 5,550 hectares; after irrigation, upon the completion of the Ataturk 
Dam in 1993, the salinized area increased to 7,498 hectares in 1997 and to 11,403 in 
2000.95 Moreover, due to excessive and uncontrolled irrigation in the Sanliurfa-Harran 
Plain, the groundwater table presented serious salinity that reached a total land area of 
40,780 hectares in 2001, compared to a land area of 2,747 hectares before irrigation took 
place. The State Hydraulic Works (DSI)  and the General Directorate of Rural Affairs 
have constructed surface and deep drainage canals on 23,000 hectares to avoid saline 
waterlogging and thus to mitigate the salinity issue in the Harran plain.96 During the year 
2006, new measures of salinity were conducted in twenty-four wells all over the Harran 
Plain. Twenty-nine percent of the wells indicated water of very high salinity, which 
restricts suitability for irrigation and can only be used for plants exhibiting good tolerance 
to salt.97 Only 29.2% of the wells indicated medium salinity, while the rest, 41.7%, 
indicated high salinity, though suitable for irrigation. Overall, according to data obtained 
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from the wells in Harran and the concentrations in chemical substances, 70.8% of the 
Harran plain is beyond the maximum allowable limit for irrigation; few places can be 
used for plants with high salt tolerance, and in places with poor drainage, the irrigation 
suitability is restricted.98  
Continuous irrigation also stimulates the density of some weed species. Weeds are 
major constraints that reduce crop yield, since they compete with crops for nutrients, 
moisture, light and space. The yield reductions due to weed-crop competition depend, 
mainly on weed species and their densities as well as crop species.99 A study conducted 
in the Harran Plain, where cotton is the major crop, showed that in a ten-year span of 
irrigation in the plain, weed flora has changed. In particular, the study compared the 
quantity and density of the most common weeds before irrigation started in 1995 with 
those of 2004. The study showed that there was a substantial decrease in the frequency of 
weeds due to continuous irrigation, but some of them displayed increased density, and 
there were a few new ones in the plain, as well. 100 The study based on the results in the 
Harran plain concluded that monoculture cotton growing leads to the adaptation of 
certain species of weeds and causes an increase in both their frequency and densities. A 
solution to the problem would be crop rotation, so as to inhibit a future adaptation pattern 
of those weeds that show strong tolerance and prolific propensity.101 
Another factor that will stress the irrigation project in the GAP area and, 
consequently, agricultural production, is climate change. Global climate change and local 
climate change caused by the construction of Ataturk, the largest dam in the GAP project,  
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will act in conjunction and will exacerbate the effects. In general, climate change 
adversely affects water availability for irrigation purposes, thus, there is a close 
relationship between the two.102 
It is projected that by the year 2070, the temperature in Turkey will have 
increased by 1 to 30 C and the relative decrease in crop yield will range between 0 and 
2.5%, depending on mitigating measures.103 A study that uses trend analysis over a 32-
year meteorogical observation in the Sanliurfa province of the GAP project showed that 
there are upward trends in temperature as well as downward trends in wind speed, which 
result in an increasing evaporation process.104 There is a cause-effect relationship 
between total irrigated land and irrigation water requirements. If the total irrigated land 
increases, irrigation water increases, and the water delivered to farmers decreases.105 The 
less water supplied to farmers, the less the yield crop will be. 
In a comparative study of twelve irrigation schemes in the GAP region, relative 
water supply and irrigation ratio were considered for the assessment of the irrigation 
scheme’s performance during the years 1997 through 2001. As the study showed, 
although more water was used than required in the GAP project, the standard gross value 
per agricultural production remained low, contrary to expectations.106 Moreover, in half 
of the irrigation schemes, the irrigation ratio in 2001 was decreased compared to 1997. 
The irrigation ratio is the indicator of farmers’ willingness to engage in irrigation. 
According to the study, the decreased ratio is attributed to factors such as national 
                                                 
102 Sermet and Derya Onder, “Evaluation of Water resources on the Basis of River Basins and the 
Probable Changes to Occur in basin Management in the Future Due to Global Climate Change,” 
Agricultural Structure and Irrigation Department (Mustafa Kemal University, 2007), 777.  
103 K. Haktanir et al., “Prospects for Desertification Impacts for Turkey, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq,” 
Department of Soil Science (Faculty of Agriculture-University of Ankara), 4–5.  
104 Husamettin Bulut et al., “Trend Analysis for Examining the Interaction Between the Ataturk Dam 
Lake and Its Local Climate,” International Journal of Natural and Engineering Sciences 1, no. 3 (Harran 
University, 2008), 117.  
105 Ali Kerem Saysel, “System Dynamics: Systemic Feedback Modeling for Water resources 
Management,” Institute of Environmental Sciences (Boğaziçi University, 2008), 41–42.  
106 H. Degirmenci and Hakan Buyukcangaz, “Assessment Schemes with Comparative Indicators in 
the Southeastern Anatolia Project,” Turkish Journal of Agriculture and Forestry 27 (2003), 302. 
 30
agricultural policy, poor farmer training, water fees, water scarcity, socioeconomics, lack 
of irrigation infrastructure, landownership and increases in input prices.107 
In the above study, the predominant crop is cotton, which gives the most profit 
compared to other crops. In particular, cotton covers, on average, 60% of the area in the 
twelve irrigation schemes and the average price per unit is roughly 453,330TL/Kg. The 
grain crop covers 38% of the area and gives roughly 173,390TL/Kg, though the 
international market price of cotton is higher than that of grain. However, the price for 
cotton declined from 1997 to 2001: it was $1.72 in 1997 and $0.96 in 2001.108 What is 
not mentioned in the study, though it can be implicitly derived from it, is the yield of the 
two crops per hectare. Cotton covers a larger area and gives more profit than grain, but 
the latter produces more yield on average; grain produces 425 Kg/hectare; cotton, 325 
Kg/hectare.109 Moreover, the study states that the method it uses to yield the performance 
results of the irrigation schemes in the GAP area requires few climatic parameters, which 
are not presented in the output results.110  
In Turkey, water is a constraint to crop production, especially for arid and semi-
arid regions, as is Southeast Anatolia, and for this reason, new water resources are 
required. Use of non-conventional water, such as drainage water and saline water is 
considered to be the best solution to the water deficit.111 Several studies have been 
conducted to determine the effects of non-conventional water on crop yields. Drainage 
water use studies have shown that wheat crops are not affected by salinity, while cotton is 
affected.112 Experiments with different levels of saline water used in sprinkler irrigation 
systems have shown that crops such as beans, pepper, lettuce and cotton displayed a 
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decreased yield as much as 63%, 13%, 6.6% and 5%, respectively.113 Based on the above 
results, the experiments indicate that non-conventional water decreases yield and, that 
vegetables are more sensitive than cotton and wheat. 
The importance of the impact of future climate changes on agricultural production 
and the need for farmers to adapt to changes in future water scarcity in the face of global 
warming are clearly demonstrated by a study conducted on the Lower Seyhan Irrigation 
Project (LSIP). This is one of the most important irrigation projects in Southern Turkey; 
though the Seyhan Basin is not part of the GAP area, it does not mean that farmers in the 
GAP area will not experience the same problems as those in the Seyhan Basin, as both 
cultivate the same crops and the Seyhan Basin has the same climate as that of the GAP 
area.114 The study tries to figure out the crop pattern to be adopted by farmers based on 
forecasts for the year 2033 as well as simulation scenarios of global warming and water 
availability for 2070s. The forecast for the year 2033, in comparison to the 2002 crop 
pattern, predicts that farmers are more likely to choose high value crops such as citrus, 
vegetables and fruit, while in 2003, the predominant crop pattern consisted of maize, 
citrus and cotton.115 On the other hand, the simulation analysis of a crop pattern of citrus, 
cotton, vegetables, watermelon and fruit showed more clear-cut results of farmers’ 
preferences. In particular, a reduction of water availability and an increase of water-
requiring crops resulted in a lowering of cotton production (49%) and an increase of 
watermelon (41.4%). Similarly, a further reduction in water availability, not only as a 
consequence of climate change, but also as a result of further expansion of irrigated land, 
showed a further decrease in cotton production and an increase in watermelon 
production.116 Notably, cotton is a more intensive water consumer than watermelon, 
while the latter, additionally, is of the same high relative value and high income crop as 
cotton. 
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Erdoğan said that problems such as falling agricultural efficiency, lack of fresh 
water, the increasing occurrence of droughts and the lack of investment in agriculture still 
had not been solved. He continued by noting that such problems would be compounded 
by the economic crisis. “Official development assistances and emergency assistance 
made by developed countries for less developed countries are estimated to decrease due 
to the economic crisis they went through,” he said, adding that this would exacerbate the 
agricultural problems facing the developing world.117 Indeed, in regard to droughts, in 
2008, according to Ali Culu, Sanliurfa’s Harran University Faculty Dean Professor, said 
that Southeastern Anatolia had been affected by the year’s drought, adding that six out of 
the nine provinces of the GAP region experienced serious harvest losses.118 As far as the 
lack of investment in agriculture is concerned, the GAP project enjoys adequate funding 
as it has taken advantage of, on average, 7.1% of Turkey’s public funds; however the 
irrigation projects are only 15% completed, while in the energy sector, 77% have been 
completed.119 One interpretation may be that the agriculture sector of the GAP project is 
not the top priority because of problems in the sector. On the contrary, the energy sector, 
which will be shown further on in the chapter, seems to have the highest priority, which 
becomes obvious from the profit of the sector and the investments that the state puts into 
it. 
1. Analysis 
During the 1960s, globally, irrigated land expanded dramatically, yielding high 
production and bringing down food prices. From 1970 to 1982, the irrigated area slowed 
down its expansion by 2% per year and from 1982 to 1994 it further slowed down by 
1.3% per year.120 Most importantly, projections for the next 25 years predict a further 
reduction in expanded irrigation by 0.6%, which is still believed to be optimistic.121 
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The irrigation program of the GAP project shows that it follows this same pattern 
of slowing expansion. In the above-described hectares of irrigated land, from 1994 
through 2009, the irrigated land expanded between 1994 and 1995 by 270%.  Then it 
began to decrease:  in the period 1995–1998 to an average 9.64%; in the period 1998–
2006 an average 4.44%, and for the period 2005–2009 an average 0.32%. 
As to the major cotton crop of the GAP region, the Harran plains are facing 
serious problems in regard to crop productivity. This is of paramount significance 
because the plains provide most of the land of the GAP region on which rests the 
economic boost that the Turkish state aspires to bring to underdeveloped Southeastern 
Anatolia. 
Firstly, the comparison between the Seyhan and Harran irrigation projects are 
closely connected to each other because before the cotton crop was cultivated in the 
Harran, it was the dominant crop in the Seyhan area. However, because of the projected 
adverse warming conditions and water availability, the cotton crop passed to the Harran 
plains and the Seyhan area switched to other non-monoculture crops. This may be 
interpreted to mean that in the future there will very likely be a shift in the Harran from 
the monoculture of cotton to a variety of agricultural crops including cotton, because the 
cotton crop is the major contributor to the already established agro-industry in Sanliurfa 
city. If this is the case, then a reduced value of the current agricultural production of the 
GAP region should be expected, since cotton is the highest value crop in terms of global 
prices. 
Secondly, cotton is suspended from the global fluctuation in market prices, which 
may render it unfavorable to the farmers’ preferences, as there are alternative high priced 
crops. Undoubtedly, the boost in the total production of the Harran plain after irrigation 
took place was tremendous. The production value skyrocketed from $18 million U.S. in 
1998 to $172 million U.S. in 2000, and then leveled out to an average $120 million U.S. 
for the period 2001–3.122 , Recently, the GAP region has been considered a possible 
golden opportunity if olive production is pursued and global oil consumption rises 
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sharply.123 Moreover, the trend in imports and exports of agricultural products that 
Turkey followed the past thirty years shows that she is turning out to be agriculturally 
dependent on imports, as the domestic demand cannot be met by production. Agricultural 
product exports were around $2 billion and its imports were only around $50 million at 
the beginning of the 1980s. In 30 years, these figures have reached $4.3 billion and $4.5 
billion, respectively, which mean a two-fold rise in exports and 90-fold rise in imports. 
Among the imports, cotton comes from Greece and the United States.124 
Thirdly, salinity, climatic change, and water scarcity as a due to climatic 
conditions put heavy load on agriculture production in the Harran Plain. The cotton crop 
seems to be the most vulnerable, because of water scarcity, and then because of salinity 
and climatic changes, while some crops are vulnerable primarily to salinity and climatic 
changes and to a lesser degree,  water shortages, while others demonstrate the same 
attitude as cotton or wheat’s tolerance to all adverse factors. 
Fourthly, surface irrigation, which is less productive than groundwater due to the 
opportunity for better control of the water used at farm level, is the predominantly 
employed technique in the GAP region.125 This practice is considered unsustainable, as it 
results in soil salinity and waterlogging, thus making agriculture impossible or capable of 
only a limited yield. Large-dam irrigation is under hopeful expectations, mainly due to 
increasing water competition for efficient irrigation, while use of groundwater and direct 
river-water abstraction without the mediation of dam and traditional harvesting systems 
are gaining in importance.126 Turkey has the alternative of resorting to a micro-irrigation 
practice, which reduces water use and keeps salinity at lower levels, however, without 
preventing the process from continuing at a slower pace though, over the long term. The 
practice achieves higher gains in a range of 70–90%, but it is extremely capital  
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intensive.127 For example, drip irrigation typically costs $1,200–2,500 per hectare, which 
means that if 10,000 hectares of the current 270,000 were to use drip irrigation, this 
would cost $12–25 million.128 
In conclusion, the agricultural sector of the GAP project seems to have run into 
multiple problems. Most of them are unpredictable and irreversible, such as salinity, 
which has put severe constraints on the expansion of the irrigated land. The goal of 
bringing 1.8 million hectares under irrigation and transforming Southeastern Anatolia 
into an agricultural export-base is not realistic. 
D. ENERGY DEMANDS IN TURKEY AND HYDROPOWER SHARE 
Given its continued economic growth, Turkey’s energy needs are ever increasing 
and rendering her an energy importing country; roughly 75% of her needs are covered 
through imports.129 In 2000, Turkey produced 26.89 mtoe (million ton oil equivalent) of 
energy from primary domestic sources, while the annual consumption was triple the 
domestic production. Moreover, projections of Turkey’s energy needs for the year 2020 
show that the same ratio of 1:3 will continue to persist in greater figures.130 Additionally, 
the ratio of energy consumption and GNP, which is 0.37 in Turkey, lags behind that of 
developed industrial nations and the EU, which are 0.66 and 0.57 respectively. If Turkey 
is devoted to catching up to developed countries and detaching from developing ones, 
energy consumption must rise significantly, thus putting this sector at the top of Turkey’s 
national agenda.131 
The gap between energy demand and supply will increase as Turkey faces a 
rapidly rising demand for energy of 8% per annum. Domestic production based on fossil 
fuel (hard coal, lignite, oil and gas) is insufficient to meet the growing energy demand. 
Among renewable sources, the most important is hydropower, which coupled with 
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lignite, contribute to the production of 50% of the electrical energy consumed in Turkey., 
Domestic renewable resources for electrical production are more efficient than those of 
fossil fuels, with the exception of gas. 132  
Renewable resources constitute 35% of energy production and 13–15% of energy 
consumption. The renewable energy potential of Turkey consists of 122.3 TWh/year of 
hydropower, 50 TWh/year of wind power, and even less from solar energy, biomass and 
geothermal power.133 The following table provides the shares of Turkish renewable 
sources to primary energy supply compared to other countries and the world: 
Table 1.   The shares of primary energy supply from different renewable sources by 
countries (2001) 134 
Ren. CRWb          Hydro          Wind         Solar/Tide     Geothermal                          Total 
 World             79.9                 26.4               0.2              0.3                   3.2                  100 
OECD             53.6                 34.8               1.0              1.0                   9.6                  100 
EU                  58.9                 33.8               2.7              0.6                   4.0                  100 
USA                67.6                 17.5               0.5              1.4                   13.0                100 
Turkey            67.4                 22.1               0.1              3.1                   7.4                  100 
 a Source: Adopted from IEA (2003a). 
 b CRW: Combustible renewable and Waste. 
 
In regard to the production of electrical power, during Ataturk's time, substantial 
capital was absorbed in the form of fixed investments in railroads, roads, harbors and 
power (electricity).135 Since the 1930s, Turkey has continued to invest heavily in its 
infrastructure, while the second half of the 1950s witnessed a substantial expansion in 
roads and dams. However, the expansion of power facilities has not been sufficiently 
rapid to meet the country's needs.136 Yet Turkey has an active and growing capacity for 
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hydropower, which takes the shape of hydroelectric power plants established by 
damming rivers. As displayed in the following table, electricity consumption makes up 
13.4% of final energy consumption, while coals and lignite make up 21.4%, yet 
electricity showed a rise of 4.1% compared to a decrease of 0.4% of coal and lignite in 
the years 1990–2000. 
Table 2.   Final Energy Consumption (in Mtoe) 137 
                                                  1990              (%)                2000                (%)      
Oil                                             19.93             47.1               26.54               43.1 
Natural gas                                 0.78               1.9                 5.09                 8.3 
Electricity                                  3.93               9.3                 8.27                13.4 
Coals and lignite                        9.27             21.8               13.19               21.4 
Non-commercial                        7.21              17.0               6.46                 10.5 
Other                                         1.26               3.0                 2.00                 3.2 
Total                                          42.34             100                61.54               100 
 Source: TUBITAK (2003). 
 
E. HYDROPOWER CONTRIBUTION IN TURKEY’S ENERGY SECTOR: 
THE GAP HYDROPOWER PLANTS 
Hydropower constitutes 24.7% of the total electricity production, while thermal 
power constitutes 75.3%. As seen in Table 2, industry consumes 38.4% of electrical 
energy production, households 34.0%, transportation 19.7%, and agriculture 4.8%.138 
Hydropower has been set up as a national program since the 1930s, when Turkey started 
the construction of 202 large and 317 small dams, of which 114 operated as hydroelectric 
power plants (HEPPs). Until the mid-1980s, plans for dam construction continued to 
materialize not only for technical reasons, but also for political ones. The Kurdish  
 
 
                                                 
137 Kaygusuz and Arsel, “Energy Politics and Policy,” 153. 
138 Kaygusuz and Arsel, “Energy Politics and Policy,” 154. 
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insurgency in Southeastern Turkey urged the construction of many dams in the area to 
bring development to an underdeveloped area, as was the case in the Southeastern 
Anatolia area of Turkey.  
The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), at its early stage, was set up to provide 
and secure an electricity supply and to bring economic development to the area. In 
reaching the final objective of installing HEPPs of 7,490 MW capacity, the project has 
been realized at 74%—5,513 MW139 and by 2013 it will further advance to roughly 88% 
with the construction of the second biggest dam—Ilisu—ongoing. The developmentalist 
view on the GAP, characterized by an aggressive support for HEPP constructions, 
remains constant in modern Turkish history. Suleyman Demiral, Turgut Ozal and lately 
Tayyip Erdogan, all Prime Ministers of Turkey, emphasized the construction of dams to 
convert water into energy for the sake of energy independence and to close the gap of 
energy imports.140 
The total hydropower electrical production gross potential of all twenty–six of 
Turkey’s basins amounts to 432,981 GWh/year, of which 140,000 GWH/year is 
technically and economically exploitable.141 Some studies have estimated the latter figure 
to be even higher. In particular, according to DSI, the economically feasible potential of 
Turkey’s basins for electrical production may reach 188,169 GWh/year.142  
Whatever the figure, both the Euphrates and Tigris rivers in the GAP area, can 
contribute to electricity production with an exploitable 37.6%, which is the biggest share 
of Turkey’s gross potential as the remaining water is shared among the other twenty-four 
basins. The GAP hydropower project consists of 11 (HEPPs) dams on the two rivers. 
Currently eight such dams are completed and operational, two are under construction, and 
two more are in the planning stages. Table 3 shows the hydro dams, both completed and 
those awaiting construction. 
                                                 
139 Republic of Turkey, “Latest Situation on Southeastern Anatolia Region: Activities of the GAP 
Administration,” (2006), 3. 
140 Kaygusuz and Arsel, “Energy Politics and Policy,” 159. 
141 Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report, 2009,” General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works 
(DSI), 2009, 20. 
142 E. Toklu et al., “Energy Production, Consumption, Policies and Recent Developments in Turkey,” 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 14 (2010), 1174 (Table 4). 
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If all hydropower dams were completed within the GAP area, the overall 
electrical production would reach 20% of the total economically exploitable electrical 
production of Turkey, which is a substantial amount if we consider that the land of 
application of the GAP project covers a mere 10% of Turkey’s surface area.143,144 In 
1998, the GAP project covered only 15% of the total electrical demand in Turkey, which 
means that there have been significant advances in the past decade.145 On the other hand, 
the demand for electric energy for 2010 has been estimated to be roughly double that of 
2006, and the projections for 2020 show a doubling of the 2010 demand. Table 4 depicts 
the outstanding increasing demand for energy as a result of Turkey’s economic growth 
and population increase.146 
Table 3.   GAP Hydroelectric generating plants in Southeastern Anatolia147 
Name Facility         Owner                 Province                     River      Capacity (MW) 
Ataturk                       DSI                     Sanliurfa                    Euphrates      2400 
Karakaya                    DSI                     Diyarbakir                  Euphrates      1800   
Birecik                        DSI                     Sanliurfa                    Euphrates       672 
*Batman                       DSI                   Batman                      Batman          198   
Karkamis                    DSI                     Kahramanmaras         Euphrates       189 
Dicle                           DSI                     Diyarbakir                  Tigris             110 
Kralkizi                       DSI                     Batman                      Tigris              94 
Ilisu                            DSI                      Batman                      Tigris              1200UC 
Sanliurfa                     DSI                     Sanliurfa                    Tigris              50 
Cizre                          DSI                      Mardin                       Tigris              240UC 
Silvan                         DSI                      Diyarbakir                 Tigris              240P 
Kayser                        DSI                      Diyarbakir                 Tigris              90P 
Sources: Balat, 2004 
P: Planned, UC: Under Construction 
*Batman River is a tributary to Euphrates 
 
                                                 
143 Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report, 2009,” 40. 
144 Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report, 2009,” 36. 
145 Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), “Sustainable Management of International Rivers; 
Case Study: Southeastern Anatolia Project in Turkey, GAP,” Center for International Studies (Zurich, 
2001), 14. 
146 Kamil Kaygusuz, “Sustainable Energy, Environmental and Agricultural Policies in Turkey,” 
Energy Conversion and Management 51 (2010), 1077.  
147 Mustafa Balat, “Turkey’s Hydropower Potential and Electricity Generation Policy Overview: 
Beginning in the Twenty-First Century,” Energy Sources 27 (2005), 953–954.  
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Table 4.   Electricity production vs. consumption in Turkey148 
Hydraulic Electricity    2000        2002          2004        2006         2010       2020 (GWh) 
Production                     309121   33732        46142     44371       65387149  97456150 
*Total Consumption     128295    132553      150018   174637     300000    580000 
*electricity produced by thermal, hydropower and imports. 
F. HYDROELECTRIC EFFICIENCY AND FINANCING 
The hydro energy realization ratio in the GAP project has reached 75% (7.49 
GW) within the project itself.151 Upon completion of the GAP hydropower project, the 
total installed capacity for electricity generation will account for 10.2 GW, which 
constitutes roughly 20% of the total gross hydroelectric energy potential of all twenty-six 
main river basins of Turkey.152 Moreover, Turkey’s current total hydroelectric 
production amounts to 44371 GWh/year for 2006, and the current hydroelectricity 
production in the GAP area constitutes 45% of the total.153  The total cost of the GAP 
project was set at $32 billion, of which $20 billion have been invested from Turkey’s 
public resources, while another $3.5 billion will be invested by the private sector.154 The 
hydroelectric dams alone have cost roughly two-thirds of the thus far invested $20 
billion, as the following Table 5 shows:  
                                                 
148 Kaygusuz, “Sustainable Energy, Environmental and Agricultural Policies in Turkey,” 1077. 
149Ayhan Demirbas and Recep Bakis, “Turkey’s Water Resources and Hydropower Potential,” Energy 
Exploration & Exploitation 21, no. 5&6 (2003), 409 (Table 3).  
150 Demirbas and Bakis, “Turkey’s Water Resources and Hydropower Potential,” 409. 
151 Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report, 2009,” 40. 
152 E. Toklu et al., “Energy Production, Consumption, Policies and Recent Developments in Turkey,” 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 14 (2010), 1175–1176. 
153 General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI), “Energy.”   
154 Ercan Ayboga, “Report About the Impacts of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) and the 
Ilisu Dam on the Downstream Countries Iraq and Syria,” Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive (August 25, 
2009), 3. 
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Table 5.   Table 5 Construction Costs of the Hydropower dams of the GAP project 
Name Facility(HEPP)                 Construction Cost (US$) 
Ataturk                                       2–4 billion155  
Karakaya                                    1.5billion156   
Birecik                                        1.25 billion157 
Karkamis                                    170 million158 
Dicle                                           120 million159 
Ilisu                                             1.5 billion160 
Total                                           9.1–11.15 billion 
Taking into account the above-mentioned issues, the contribution of hydropower 
energy to the Turkish economy in the GAP project can be estimated. In particular, the 
value of hydroelectric energy per kWh is about 9 cents (US$), and given the current 
electricity production of the GAP hydropower plants, the output amounts to $2.46 
billion/year.161 
In 2006, the commitment of the Turkish state to invest in the energy sector was 
obvious when 26% of a $30 billion investment was directed to the energy sector. The 
Turkish electricity sector received a share of 51% of the above investment for generation, 
transmission lines and other related equipment.162 
                                                 
155 John Kolars and William A. Mitchell, The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Project 
(Southern Illinois University, 1991), 40. 
156 Patrick McCully Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams (Zed Books, 2001), 
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157 Econ Pöyry AS, “A Review of Private-Public Partnership Models in Hydropower Projects,” Econ-
Report No. 200–065, 45. 
158 Jack Kalpakian, Identity, Conflict and Cooperation in the International River Systems (Ashgate, 
2004), 104 
159 Kiska Construction Cooperation, Database of Dams. 
160 Tahir Ongur, “A Defective Project: Ilisu Dam,” 4.  
161 Dogan Altinbilek, “The Role of Dams in Development,” Water Science and Technology 45, no. 8 
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From Table 4, it becomes obvious that in the future, hydropower electrical 
production will not be sufficient to meet the growing Turkish domestic needs. Among the 
twenty-six basins of the country, the Euphrates-Tigris hydropower potential amounts to 
one-third of the total, and it is found in the Southeastern Anatolia region. Hydropower 
production in the world is set to grow slowly up to 2030, but its share in global electricity 
generation will drop from 7% to 6%.163 As a result, Turkey will follow the same trend: 
its electricity demand will grow 6–8% yearly. However, due to the high hydropower 
potential of the country, Turkey is committed to reducing electricity imports to eliminate 
her financial deficit in the sector. Currently, Turkey is importing electricity, and has 
signed an agreement with its neighbor, Bulgaria, which will allow Turkey to purchase 
33.7 billion kWh of electricity over the 10-year period from 1999 to 2009.164 The GAP 
region’s hydropower plants have played a significant role in the electricity import/export 
balance.165 In 2000, Turkey imported 3786GWh and exported only 413GWh, while in 
2006 a remarkable reverse trend was noticed, as imports reduced to 573GWh and exports 
reached 2236GWh. The construction of the Ilisu Dam, which began in 2008, will 
contribute significantly to electricity production, as it will be the second largest after the 
Ataturk Dam.  
Since hydroelectric energy is a renewable source, it can easily be exported to EU-
member countries where use of clean, green energy is encouraged. A project is currently 
underway to link Turkey’s electricity grid to neighboring Greece’s, which is negotiating 
an eventual link to the pan-European electricity network, UCTE. Italy, a market ten times 
greater than Greece, is already connected to a Greek power network via an existing 
underwater power line and it will be accessible to Turkish energy exporters once 
Turkey’s connection to Greece is completed.166  
                                                 
163 Kamil Kaygusuz, “Sustainable Energy, Environmental and Agricultural Policies in Turkey,” 
Energy Conversion and Management 51 (2010), 1077. 
164 U.S. Department of Energy, “An Energy Overview of the Republic of Turkey.” 
165 GAP-GIDEM, “Competitiveness Agenda for the GAP Region,” GAP Entrepreneur Support 
Centers Project (October 2007), 104. 
166 GAP-GIDEM “Competitiveness Agenda for the GAP Region,” 105. 
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However, there is a weak link in the electrical grid of Turkey, which affects 
production: the status of the transmission lines. The present energy transmission lines 
will not be able to carry all the produced power, while the existing construction facilities 
(equipment and manpower) will not be sufficient to construct all projects within ten 
years’ time.167 While the transmission energy loss is 2.5–3% within the world standards, 
the distribution losses are much too high at 15%.168 If Turkey reduces the distribution 
loss, it will add more to total electricity production.      
Turkey is set to allocate huge investments in the energy sector for the period 
2007–2020. Around $72 billion in investments are planned to be allocated to the energy 
sector, of which 82% will be absorbed by the electricity sector, 9% by gas, 6% by oil, and 
1% by solid fuels.169 This means that, annually, the electricity sector will receive $4.5 
billion, an increase compared with the $3.9 billion in 2006. The GAP project will absorb 
a substantial amount of the annual investment, as the second hydropower plant is already 
being constructed with a calculated cost of $1.5 billion and is set to be completed by the 
year 2011.170 
G. CONCLUSIONS: COMPARING THE AGRICULTURAL AND ENERGY 
SECTORS OF THE GAP PROJECT  
Juxtaposing the agricultural and energy sectors of the GAP project, the 
agricultural sector is lagging far behind the energy sector in physical realization, and with 
the likelihood for this trend to be continued until the full completion of the energy sector. 
In general, agriculture in Turkey has been declining since the establishment of the 
Turkish state. The agricultural sector of the GAP project has been realized at 15% after 
sixteen years (1994–2009) of operation. The reason for this is that it is facing severe 
challenges of salinity, continuous irrigation, climatic change and water scarcity, which 
                                                 
167 James McKeigue, “Turkey Opens Electricity Markets as Demand Grows,” Power, 2009. 
168 E. Toklu et al., “Energy Production, Consumption, Policies and Recent Developments in Turkey,” 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 14 (2010), 1180. 
169 Toklu et al., “Energy Production, Consumption, Policies and Recent Developments in Turkey,”  
1180. 
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Daily Monitor 5, no. 135 (2008).  
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have slowed down the expansion of irrigated land. This slowdown follows the globally 
diminishing trend of agriculture. Due to these challenges, the realization of 1.8 million 
hectares under irrigation cannot be achieved.  Moreover, the agriculture in the GAP 
region is facing global market competition with its cotton crop, which plays a significant 
role in Turkish revenues. 
As to contribution to national growth, agricultural production was unambiguously 
boosted due to the new irrigation method from dams, but only for a short period of time 
(1994–2001), which happens to coincide with the first years of the project’s irrigation 
function. Despite the fact that the revenues from the production from 1994 up to 2003 
reached the accumulated amount of $1.07 billion,171 compared with the yearly revenues 
of $2.46 billion of the energy sector, it seems that agriculture does not pay off as well as 
energy does.  
Official documents relating to agriculture sector production issued by the GAP-
RDA administration mention the yields in production up to the year 2001–02. Few of 
these published between the period 2004–8 and older academic articles relating to the 
same sector mention the specific period of time, 1994–2002, as an example of the success 
of the agricultural sector of the GAP project. It is argued that the production of cotton in 
the GAP region reached a plateau after the 2001–2002 for the aforementioned reasons. 
Moreover, the cotton production value in 1995 was $91,000172 (cotton price $0.91)173 
and in 2001 was $453,330 (cotton price $0.96), while in 2005 it was $732,662174 (cotton 
price $1.12), which when converted into 2001 prices becomes $627,996. From the above 
figures, it becomes evident that by comparing the values of the crop between the years 
1995 and 2001, indeed cotton production in the GAP region skyrocketed, despite the 
marginal fluctuation of its price. During the period 2001–2005 and taking into account 
the fluctuation of the price, crop production was increased by roughly 50% compared 
                                                 
171 Natalie Arsenault et al., “People and Place: Curriculum Resources on Human-Environmental 
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with an increase of over 400% in the 1995–2001 period. Given the 0.32% rate of the 
expansion of the irrigated land after 2005, it may be anticipated that the rise of crop 
production must be marginal compared to the period 2001–2005 where the rate of the 
expansion of the irrigated land was 4.44% on average per annum.  
The above account is of great importance for further evaluating the performance 
of the GAP project in the agriculture sector. According to the World Commission of 
Dams, large irrigation projects typically fall short of physical targets, failing to recover 
their costs and being less profitable in economic terms. In particular, indicators for the 
potential performance of large irrigation projects include physical performance of the 
area irrigated, crop yields and value of production, as well as net financial and economic 
benefits.175 
On the other hand, the ever-increasing demands for Turkey’s energy render the 
sector the most valuable, and the GAP project with its hydroelectric power plants plays a 
significant role in Turkey’s economy. According to the General Directorate of Hydraulic 
Works (DSI), the dams dedicated to hydropower electricity production demonstrate full 
cost recovery and multiple increases in production value compared to the agricultural 
sector, in the short and medium-term period of time. For example, Karakaya (1987) and 
Ataturk (1992) dams fully recovered their cost in an average time span of four to nine 
years after their construction. Moreover, their production value surpassed their cost of 
construction two-fold in an average period span of eight to eighteen years, depending on 
the size of the dam. Additionally, the accumulated profit since the year of its completion 
for each of the above dams has been up to 2003, $5.8 and $4.2 billion, respectively, with 
an average price of 5 cents per KWh.176 This means that only two of the eight 
hydropower electric dams account for $1.125 billion per year profit on average. 
However, in the long term, the nation’s hydropower capacity for electricity 
production is set to be exhausted. The GAP hydropower project is near  completion, and 
along with it, the technically and economically exploitable water of Turkey’s 
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Southeastern Anatolia region reaches its limits. In the long term, the energy sector of the 
GAP project will play a diminishing role in the production of electricity, to the benefit of 
the nation. 
Chapter III delineates the orientation of the GAP project towards industrialization 
and infrastructure, which implicitly justifies the declining role of agriculture, as selective 
macro and micro-economic indicators indicate the socioeconomic development of the 
GAP project within the context of human development sustainability. 
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III. THE GAP PROJECT AND SOCIOECONOMIC RESULTS IN 
THE AREA OF IMPLEMENTATION: SOUTHEASTERN 
ANATOLIA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will challenge, from the theoretical and factual perspective, the 
philosophy of sustainable human development on which the GAP project rests. This 
objective is important as it aims at the well-being of the whole of Turkey, in general, and 
of the people in the region, in particular.177 In doing so, the chapter will provide a 
definition of sustainable development, which incorporates three dimensions—
environmental, social, and economic—all equally developed to produce sustainability. 
Then it will examine the socioeconomic dimension within the context of the well-being 
of the people in the GAP region. It will give a quantitative, followed by a qualitative, 
analysis of GAP project progress in specific sectors, which have been set as main 
objectives of the GAP Master Plan to be achieved for sustainable development: to 
provide better social services, education, health, employment opportunities, migration 
control,, infrastructure and industrial development, and to attract qualified personnel to 
the area.178  
This chapter will also touch upon the issue of environmental impact in the region 
as a consequence of the construction of dams by examining the Ilisu, Cizre and Ataturk 
Dams in the GAP region to outline the environmental policy of the Turkish state.  
The main method to be used in addressing the above issues will be the 
comparative case method by which the progress of the project in its main objectives of 
the GAP Master Plan will be the focus. Two time frames: 1980–2001 and 2001–2009 
will be juxtaposed. The former time frame is important because it gives information on 
the socioeconomic status of Southeastern Anatolia before the official establishment of the 
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GAP administration in 1989. Additionally, this period is important because in 1990, the 
biggest dam—Ataturk—was completed, and by 1994, irrigated land was increasing fast 
and boosting agriculture production, contributing to the economic lifting of the area. The 
significance of this period is in the operation of the Ataturk Dam, because it is by far the 
most complex and ambitious part of the GAP project, to meet the project’s goals.179 The 
second period will be used for comparison with either the short-term period, 1994–2001, 
or the pre-GAP period. In this way, there will be a measurement of the progress of the 
GAP project within its time frame of operation, 1994–2009, as well as the magnitude of 
the progress in respect to the pre-GAP period. Lastly and most importantly, the chapter 
will rely, mainly, for reference and comparisons, on the related data to the level of 
development of the region before the project’s operation and projected data for the year 
2005, stated by the GAP-RDA president. 
B. DEFINITION OF SUSTAINABILITY: THE THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Sustainability means attending to and combining the important areas of 
environment, economics, and social equity. Without a coordinated effort addressing each 
of these functions, sustainability and sustainable development cannot be addressed or 
adequately achieved.180  
The concept was coined explicitly to suggest that it was possible to achieve 
economic growth and industrialization without environmental damage.181 However, in 
the process of economic growth through industrialization, environmental degradation was 
unavoidable. Therefore, the core of mainstream sustainability thinking has become the 
idea of three dimensions: environmental, social and economic sustainability. In Figure 1, 
there is a multi-schematic representation of sustainable development as ‘pillars,’ 
concentric circles, and as interlocking circles. The message conveyed by these three 
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representations, and made more vivid by the interlocking circles model, is that the three 
objectives need to be better integrated, with action to redress the balance between 
dimensions of sustainability (Figure 1).182 
 
Development: Pillars, Circles, Interlocking Circles 
 
A. Pillars       B. Concentric circles 
       
C. Overlapping Circles 
 
Figure 1.   Three Visual Representations of Sustainable Development 
A second definition of sustainability focuses on the ethical ideas based on the 
obligations toward future generations and presupposes intergenerational equity. Ethicists 
would agree to a definition similar to this: “Sustainability means that present and future 
persons have the same right to find, on the average, equal opportunities for realizing 
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their concepts of a good human life.”183 Accordingly, sustainable development is 
development that reaches or maintains a sustainable state. Technological improvement 
and economic growth are components of sustainable development only if they contribute 
to a sustainable state.184 
According to OECD, a third definition of sustainability is based on the energy and 
agriculture sectors. An energy supply sector can best advance sustainable development by 
producing and delivering secure and environmentally friendly sources of energy and by 
increasing the efficiency of energy use. These qualities are frequently stated in terms of 
energy security, economic development and environmental protection. The current 
methods of meeting these criteria involve ensuring fuel diversity, supplier diversity, 
sound transmission and distribution infrastructure, efficient conversion and delivery 
technologies, and low- and zero-carbon technologies.185 
On the other hand, the latest global projections of macroeconomic and 
demographic trends have challenging implications for the sustainability of world 
agriculture. Again, three dimensions of sustainability are involved: economic, 
environmental and social. The complexity of addressing agricultural challenges is 
compounded by the need to encourage sufficient food production, protect the 
environment, and ensure sustainable rural livelihoods.186 
Of the three definitions, the first one focuses on the balance to be achieved for 
sustainable development among the three dimensions while economic and social growth 
take place. In this case, emphasis is put on economic and social growth, and that 
environmental protection should follow suit. The second definition conveys a moralistic 
concept of sustainability by emphasizing the value of the equity right of forthcoming 
generations to have the same opportunity for well-being. This is also stated by the 
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Republic of Turkey. The third definition implies the question of how efficient state 
activities are, in agricultural and energy sectors, to promote or maintain the sustainability 
described in the first holistic definition. Though this definition could also be applied in 
the case of the GAP project, as the development of land and water resources for irrigation 
and electricity production is the backbone of the GAP project,187 the official reports of 
the Republic of Turkey emphasize the human development issue as the following 
statements concerning the scope of the project witness: 
The project plans to develop the long ignored Southeastern Turkey, where 
a major outflow of population has been combined with high levels of 
unemployment and political instability. (GAP 2003)188 
 
The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) seeks to uplift the income levels 
and living standards of people living in the region by mobilizing and 
utilizing resources existing in the region, to remove interregional 
disparities and to contribute nationwide goals of economic development 
and social stability. As such it is a very important and comprehensive 
project with international implications. (GAP-RDA 2006)189 
 
The project rests upon the philosophy of sustainable human development, 
which aims to create an environment in which future generations can 
benefit and develop. The basic strategies of the project include fairness in 
development, participation, environmental protection, employment 
generation, and infrastructure development. This massive development 
effort gives priority to economic, social and cultural advancement and 
well being of the whole country in general and of the people of the region 
in particular. (GAP-Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI) 2009)190 
From the above more or less overlapping and not overriding statements, I argue 
that within the broad context of sustainability, the GAP project aims primarily at social 
and economic development, and secondarily at environmental development, which is in  
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contradiction, at least in theory, with the three dimensional equity of sustainability. It 
remains to be seen, in reality, whether the GAP project has progressed in its objectives to 
claim sustainability. 
C. SUSTAINABILITY FROM THE FACTUAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. Massive Migration 
One component of sustainability in the GAP project is the control of migration. 
Massive migration flow from Southeastern Anatolia to Western Turkey may undermine 
the sustainability of society and the development of the region, thus it needs to be 
regulated on the basis that the project will generate income to alleviate economic 
inequalities between regions.191 Table 6 provides statistics on the issue of the evolution 
of migration from the area. It is obvious at first glance that after the year 2001, out-
migration has been reduced radically in the area, though it continues at a slower rate.  
Similarly, Table 7 displays the evolution of out-migration, on average, for the 
calendar year 2008–2009 in juxtaposition to the rate of out-migration of each province of 
the GAP project for the year 2000. Noticeably, Gaziantep is the exception to the other 
provinces as it has been experiencing in-migration at a greater rate than out-migration, 
but at a reduced rate in relation to 2008 and 2009: 34,125 out-migrated and 36,075 in-
migrated, respectively.192 Specifically, the trend of out/in migration in Gaziantep had 
been improving through the years 1980–2000; the rate of out-migration was 1.8% in the 
years 1975–80, 5.2% in the years 1980–85, 0.5% in the years 1985–1990 and reversed to 
an in-migration of 3.1% in the years 1995–2000.193 As of 2000, Gaziantep retains 
roughly the same rate. 
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Source: State Institute of Statistics (SIS) 
Table 7.   GAP Provinces Migration Statistics (2008–9)197 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute 
*Each figure in parenthesis represents one province, while figures without asterisks represent the average 
value of all the provinces they refer to. Figures in parenthesis refer to the year 2000 
                                                 
194 Turkish Statistical Institute.  
195 Turkish Statistical Institute.  
196 Turkish Statistical Institute.  
197 Turkish Statistical Institute.  
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However, it must be said that the figures for the year 2000 are a bit deceiving. 
During the decades 1980–2000, there was a massive deportation of Kurds in the 
Southeastern Anatolia region due to Turkish military aggression against the PKK 
insurgency. According to Kurdish organizations, half of the Kurdish population was 
forced to leave the southeastern provinces between 1982 and 1997. The Turkish 
government reported that through 1997 the total number reached the figure of 336,717 
(U.S. State department 1998).198 On the other hand, the KHRP199 gave an estimate of 
displaced Kurds at approximately of 3,750,000. The IHD200 and the UNHCR201 reported 
in 1996 that 2,540 villages had been destroyed and 3 million people displaced since 1984 
as a consequence of both Turkish military aggression and economic hardship.202 Kolars 
and Mitchell’s report of the average-sized village in Turkey of 650 habitats seems to be 
closer to the KHRP’s report.203 Therefore, it is not clear to what extent the GAP project 
has reversed and controlled the out-migration in the region.  Instead, it can be inferred 
that there is a tendency toward stabilization of the out-migration, though a negative sign 
still persists in the above statistics. 
2. Urbanization-Rural Migration  
Urbanization and rural migration are two components of the sustainability of the 
GAP project that must interact in harmony within the projected population size; 
urbanization is desirable, while rural migration should slow down.204 The optimum 
combination of urbanization was set for the year 2005 at 66% for a population size of ten  
 
                                                 
198 Kristiina Koivunen, “The Invisible War in North Kurdistan,” (2002), 164. 
199 Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP). 
200 Institute of Human Development (IHD). 
201 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
202 Koivunen, “The Invisible War in North Kurdistan,” 165–166. 
203 Kolars and Mitchell, The Euphrates River and Southeast Anatolia Development Project (Southern 
Illinois University, 1991), 33 (Table 2.5). 
204 Unver, “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” Water Resources Development 13, no. 4 (1997), 
461. 
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million people along with a fertility rate of 2.49%.205 The urbanization of the area has 
been speeding up since the 1960s. Table 8 provides the rate of urbanization in the GAP 
region 
Table 8.   Urbanization rates in the GAP Region (1960–2009) 
 1960206 rate (%) 1985 1990207 2000208 2009* 
Southeast Urban 29.8 49.9 55.7 63 68.37 
Southeast Rural 70.2 51.1 44.3 37 31.63 
Source: own calculation 
*Address-Based Population Registration System Population Census and the author’s own calculations. 
http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Kitap.do?metod=KitapDetay&KT_ID=11&KITAP_ID=139  
 
The increase in population and the fertility rate in the GAP region are given in 
Table 9 and Table 10, while in Table 11, the annual growth rates of districts are 
juxtaposed with those of towns and villages for each province of the GAP region for 
comparison: 
Table 9.   Total fertility rate (%)209 
                                                       1980           1985                 1990            2000      2009*
Turkey                                            3.41            2.59                  2.65             2.57        2.21 
GAP Region                                  4.63             4.02                  4.37             4.07        < 2 
Source: SIS, 1997, 23 
*Turkish Statistical Institute 
                                                 
205 Unver, “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” 462–463 (Table 3). 
206 Servet Mutlu, “The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) of Turkey: its Context, Objectives and 
Prospects,” Orient 37, no. 1 (1996), 62. 
207 Unver, “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” 462. 
208 Ahmet Ozer, “Influences of SAP as A Development Project to the Urban and Regional 
Development in the EU Integration Process,” International Journal of Human Sciences 4, no. 1 (2007), 7. 
209 Gülen Elmas, “Women, Urbanization and Regional Development in Southeast Anatolia: A Case 
Study for Turkey,” Turkish Studies 5, no. 3 (2004), 9. 
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Table 10.   Increase in population in GAP Region (rates)210  
                      1970–75     1975–80      1980–85      1985–90       1990–2000211   2000–09*  
Turkey                2.5             2.07             2.45           2.17                 1.8                  0.78 
GAP Region       3.37           3.63             3.75            3.51                 2.5                  1.44 
*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, GAP-RDA (2006) and the author’s own calculations 
 
Table 11.   Annual growth (rate) in villages and district/cities (2008–9)212 
GAP Provinces city and districts town and villages Average Urban vs. 
Rural growth rate*
Adiyaman 2.59 -2.08  
Diyarbakir 2.6 -1.25  
Gaziantep 3.06 -1.18  
Mardin -0.06 -3.91  
Siirt 2.74 -0.97 2.032 vs. -0.67 
Sanliurfa 1.55 3.66  
Batman 3.69 0.53  
Sirnak 0.26 0.28  
Kilis 1.86 -0.115  
*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute and the author’s own calculations 
 
For the decade 1990–2000, the annual urban increase in population in the GAP 
region was 3.7%, while the increase in its rural population was 0.7%.213 On the other 
hand, from Tables 8 and 11, we can infer that the urban process has exceeded the 
optimum goal and is still growing, while rural growth has begun to decline. Tables 9 and 
                                                 
210 Mutlu, “The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) of Turkey: its Context, Objectives and 
Prospects,” 62. (Table 1) 
211 Ozer, “Influences of SAP as A Development Project to the Urban and Regional Development in 
the EU Integration Process,” 8. 
212 Turkish Statistical Institute.  
213 Ozer, “Influences of SAP as a Development Project to the Urban and Regional Development in the 
EU Integration Process,” 8. 
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10 indicate that the population did not reach the projected figure for 2005; moreover, it 
had not reached it in 2009 (see Table 6). The imbalance between urbanization and rural 
growth within a specific population size will put heavy pressure on cities, diminish rural 
growth, and thus, challenge the sustainability goal of the project.  
3. Income and Unemployment  
The index of GDP per capita is important for displaying actual development in the 
GAP region. The goal of the GAP project development was to more than quadruple the 
GDP per capita in the region, which was $637214 in 1985 on the basis of removing 
interregional disparities, and bridge the economic gap between the Southeastern Anatolia 
region and the rest of Turkey.215 Although it is extremely difficult to retrieve data for the 
GAP region from official sources after the year 2000, due to a lack of statistics, we can 
infer some conclusions based on past data and the current GDP performance in Turkey. 
Table 12 displays how per capita income in Turkey and the GAP region has evolved. 
Also, the Southeastern Anatolia region is considered one of a group of economically 
lagging areas in Turkey, made up of the Black Sea, East and Southeast Anatolia regions, 
which displayed, on average, a GDP per capita of 60% of Turkey’s total.216 However, the 
UNDP estimates a much lower GDP percentage, of some 40%, for the same group.217    
Additionally, according to Theil Indices, which measure more precisely than Gini, 






                                                 
214 Unver, “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” 461. 
215 GAP-Regional Development Administration (GAP-RDA, 2006), 1. 
216 World Bank Document Report No. 39194-TR, “Turkey Country economic Memorandum: 
Sustaining High growth: Selected Issues,” (April 2008), 128. 
217 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Assessment of Development Results: 
evaluation of UNDP Contribution (Turkey),” Evaluation Office (May 2010), 8.  
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largest GDP per capita contribution to the nation by 5%, compared to the rest of the 
lagging group, of which Southeastern Anatolia contributes the least, by 2%,  and Eastern 
Anatolia contributes more with 2.7%.218  
Table 12.   GDP per capita actual growth (USD) and percentage 
                              1988(1)   1990(2)1995(2) 1998        2001(4)       2006       2008(6)       2009(6)  
Turkey                   1350      2655   2727    3213(3)     2146         4221(5)     12100       11200    
GAP Region          637       1569   1428     1735(7)     1186           -             5200(5)         -       
Percentage(%)       47.18     59.09   52.36    54(4)        55.26                        42.97           -       
Sources:  
(1)I.H. Olcay Unver, 462. 
(2) Gülen Elmas, 7 (Table 3). 
(3) http://www.romturkonline.com/English/Turkey/chp3.htm  
(4) GAP-RDA (June, 2006), 2. 
(5)Croatian Med Journal http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2205969  
(6) www.turkey-now.org   
(7) CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html   
 
From the above, and supported by the data in Table 12, it seems that for the 
period 2001–2009, the GDP per capita in the GAP region, in relation to nation’s GDP, 
has worsened compared to the period 1988–2001. Significantly, it seems that the GDP 
per capita in the GAP region is even worse than that of the pre-GAP project period. 
However, from the nine provinces of the GAP region, two present some dynamic for 
further development. Gaziantep displays a GDP per capita of 74.20% of that of Turkey, 
and Diyarbakir 61.20% (2001 prices).219 The following macroeconomic indicators on 
unemployment and poverty may offer a clearer picture on economic development in the 
region. 
                                                 
218 World Bank Document Report No. 39194-TR, “Turkey Country economic Memorandum: 
Sustaining High growth: Selected Issues,” 152 (Table 5.14).  
219 World Bank Document Report No. 39194-TR, 136 (Table 5.7). 
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With regard to unemployment, which will be used interchangeably with 
employment, the GAP project aims at providing 3.8 million jobs in various sectors by the 
year 2005, compared to 1.5 million jobs in 1985.220 This statement has been used in 
official documents from 1997 up until 2009.221 
Unemployment rates in Southeastern Anatolia, juxtaposed to national rates, are 
extremely difficult to find in official announcements; additionally, there is a great 
divergence in the numbers displayed by newspapers and scholars compared to those of 
the Turkish Statistical Institute, which does not provide regional comparisons among the 
provinces or relative status for each province within Turkey. According to the Turkish 
Statistical Institute, the unemployment rate for the year 2009 was 13%, diminishing to 
12% for the year 2010, while the labor force participation increased from 47.3% to 49% 
for the same period.222 Other resources report relative figures on the issue for the years 
2008 and 2009 as being very close to Turkish statistics. Newspaper sources report the 
same figures and with respect to the southeast region, rates are much higher than the 
national average. Lastly, there are sources validating the Turkish Statistical institute, but 
they present a sort of hidden unemployment, especially among young populations. Table 
13 gives an overall status of Turkey and the GAP region’s unemployment trends 
                                                 
220 Unver, “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” 461. 
221 Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report 2009” (2009), and GAP-Regional Development 
Administration (GAP-RDA, 2006). 
222 Turkish Statistical Institute.  
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Table 13.   Compared Unemployment in Turkey and GAP Region (1980–2010)223 
Average 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 






GAP region % 4.3 6.1 7.8 10.4 12.1  
14.5(3) 
17.4(4) - - 
Relative 
Increase 
0.7 1.4 2.4 3.2 3.2 4.2 6.4–6.2 - - 
Sources: SIS (2003a), Turkish Institute of Statistics (2009) 
(1)World Bank Document, Report No. 39194-TR, (April, 2008),  105 (fig. 4.7) 
(2)CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html  
(3) http://www.kurdish-info.eu/media/files/GABBReport.pdf  
(4)http://www.upi.com/Business_News/2010/03/03/  
(5)UNDP Activity Report (January-December, 2009), 3. 
http://www.undp.org.tr/povRedDocuments/WE_Activity_Report_January_December_2009_final.pdf  
 
The World Bank reports that the 2005 figure represents the age group 15–64, 
while the group 15–24 represents a higher national unemployment rate of 19.1%. Also, 
the CIA reports 4% underemployment for the year 2008. For the period 2005–9, the 
unemployment rate of the age group <25 increased from 17.4 to 22.4%.224 In the cities of 
Şanlıurfa and Diyarbakir, in the GAP region, unemployment is reported to be 18.8%.225 
The highest unemployment, at 22.1%, has been noticed in the southeastern province of 
Şırnak. The lowest participation rates were found in Diyarbakır (26.9%), Siirt (27.2%) 
and Şırnak (29.8%), while the average for Turkey is 46.9%.226 Kurdish sources align 
closely with all the above sources except the Turkish Statistical Institute; the Kurdish 
sources report that the participation in the labor force of the GAP region by the young 
group is an extremely low 30%, (2005), while for the region, the age group 15–64  
 
                                                 
223 Enver E. Dincsoy and Fumikau Ichiminami, “An Assessment of the Southeastern Anatolia Region 
in Turkey in Terms of the Sustainable Development Targets,” Journal of the Faculty of Environmental 
Science and Technology 11, no. 1 (Okayama University, 2006), 77 (fig. 2).  
224European Commission (EUROSTAT). Statistics.  
225 Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review, “Turkey ranks second-worst in European 
unemployment.” 
226 Today’s Zaman Newspaper, “Provincial unemployment figures reveal drastic economic disparity 
in Turkey.”  
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participation is 40% (2005) still below the national average. Moreover, the same sources 
report that Şanlıurfa and Diyarbakir had unemployment rates of 12% and 15%, 
respectively, for the year 2005.227 
In conclusion, the Southeastern Anatolia region appears to be stricken by 
increased unemployment and low participation by the populations in the labor force of 
the region, far below the national levels. Moreover, from Table 13, unemployment both 
in Turkey and Southeastern Anatolia has been constantly increasing since the year 1980. 
However, the rate of increase in the GAP region has been greater than that of the nation. 
Significantly, during the period 1995–2000, which marked the first five years of the 
initialization of the GAP project, the unemployment rate did not recede, and neither did it 
advance; it remained at the same level. Additionally, from the year 2000 up to 2008, 
unemployment started increasing at a greater rate, despite the thirteen-year period of the 
GAP project’s operations. We can estimate that for the years 2008–2010, unemployment 
in the GAP region ranges from 19% to 22%, according to published sources, thus 
increasing the relative gap between the region’s and the nation’s absolute percentages of 
unemployment. It seems impossible to have achieved the goal of 3.8 million jobs with 
such a high unemployment rate in the region. 
4. Poverty 
Poverty in the Southeastern Anatolia region is an issue not highlighted in the 
official documents related to the objectives of the GAP project; rather, it is overshadowed 
by more frequently used terms such as “economic development” and “uplifting the 
income levels and living standards of the people in the region.” However, it is a 
necessary condition to be mitigated for a sustainable society.228 While unemployment 
and migration fall directly into the project’s objectives, poverty is an issue correlated to 
unemployment and migration, and it counts as an index of the well-being of the people in 
the region.  
                                                 
227 Mustafa Sonmez, “Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia: Socioeconomic Problems and 
Recommended Solutions,” A Research by the Union of Southeastern Anatolia Region Municipalities and 
Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipality (Diyarbakir, 2008), 11.  
228 Unver, “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP).” 
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In Turkey, individual poverty based on expenditure was 15.06% in total, 8.01% in 
urban areas and 31% in rural areas.229 In the Eastern and Southeastern regions, poverty 
rates were 43.8% and 46.64%, respectively. While the monthly expenditures for families 
in the big cities of Turkey reaches $800, for cities like Mardin, Batman, Sirnak, and Siirt 
of the GAP region, expenditures reach $320US in 2004 prices. 230 As to the total 
expenditures in the GAP region during 2003–2006, 4.7% was done by households, which 
dropped to 4.4% for the period 2006–2008, thus it can be inferred that the above monthly 
family expenditure has been reduced.231 
A recent survey by Bosporus University in Diyarbakir, which enjoys a richer 
status than other cities of the GAP region, covered 5,706 households in five of 
Diyarbakir’s poorest neighborhoods and found that 309 households (5.4%) had no 
income at all, while 1,787 (31.3%) had total incomes of less than $200 per month. Only 
933 households (16.4%) had total monthly incomes of more than $400, which is 
considered the poverty line in Turkey.232 
Based on the above statistics, poverty has not been alleviated in the GAP region. 
5 Impact of Dams on the Southeastern Anatolia Region (GAP) 
In general, the environmental impacts of dams, due to their construction and 
operation, are numerous, including upstream and downstream changes in morphology, 
hydrology, water quality, and including local disruptions in the riverine ecosystem.233 In 
the case of Turkey and the GAP project, there is a gap between what the state heralds in 
environmental sustainability and what it applies on the ground in the Euphrates-Tigris 
basin. 
                                                 
229 Turkish Statistical Institute, Press Release on Results on the 2008 Poverty Study No 205 
(December 2009), 2. 
230 Esra Saatci and Ersin Akpinar, “Assessing Poverty and Related Factors in Turkey,” Croatian 
Medical Journal (Review) 48 (2007), 632 (Table 2). 
231 Turkish Statistical Institute, “Household Consumption Expenditures (Regional).”  
232The Jamestown Foundation, “New Turkish Study Highlights Poverty among Kurds,” Eurasia Daily 
Monitor 4, no. 186.  
233 Patrick McCully, Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and the Politics of Large Dams (Zed Books, 2001), 
30–31. 
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The construction of dams, the installation of equipment for hydro-power electrical 
production and irrigation projects, and the preparation of a large area to support a dam—
depending on its size—transform the natural scene of the selected site as well as the 
habitat of many species. For the GAP region, projects are lacking an Environmental 
Impact Assessment Study (EIAS) for the preservation, conservation, and protection of the 
environment due to construction of GAP dams. Instead, as of 1993, several studies 
focused only on the Tigris basin were made to reduce the adverse environmental effects 
and remake the environment within the context of sustainable environmental 
development. However, these studies were related to urban infrastructure, agro-
industries, transportation, and social services and not to the dams of the GAP project 
itself. On the other hand, EIASs for the irrigation schemes of the GAP project were made 
to minimize disruption to the environment in which impacts could be pinpointed and 
mitigation measures defined.234  
In 2002, the GAP Regional Development Administration (GAP-RDA) launched 
“Wildlife Project,” which was completed in 2004, for the assessment of biodiversity in 
the GAP region and the improvement of natural habitats.235 In 2008, the EIA Regulation 
was amended and called for the participation of all local people to state their opinions 
about water development activities. Their opinions would affect the final decision about 
the project: either the project would be withdrawn or be revised to fit public opinion.236 
The Turkish state gives such substantial attention to the preservation of the environment 
that it has in its constitution Article 56 declaring that “Everybody has the right to live in a 
healthy and well-balanced environment” and that “The development of the environment, 
the protection of the environmental health and the prevention of environmental pollution 
are the mission of the Government and the Citizens.” For the above reasons, in 2003, the 
Ministry of the Environment and Forestry was established,237 not only for the GAP  
 
                                                 
234 Unver, “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” 478–9. 
235 Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report 2009,” General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works 
(DSI) (2009),  43–44. 
236 Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report 2009,” 27. 
237 Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report 2009,” 31. 
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region, but for the whole country. The General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, 
with the following statement gives a vivid account of the significance of dams for the 
nation: 
Dams are very important for Turkey because they aren’t only contributing 
to the wealth and health of the people, they are also considered the best 
means of repairing the destruction made by the uncontrolled water power 
on earth. Destructions by the uncontrolled water power are not only to the 
lands or the plants, but also to the people around there, to the climate, to 
the wildlife, in summary to the whole nature. If they are not properly 
controlled, they create social and economic disasters. On the other hand, 
Turkey has been badly suffering from long lasting draughts. We have lost 
our forests, our vegetation, and most of our wildlife habitat, mostly 
because of land erosion created by our uncontrolled rivers.238 
In addition to the above general statement, in the GAP region, the extremely high 
seasonal and annual flow fluctuations of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers were of great 
concern to Turkey because they affected winter and summer crops as the flows occurred 
inopportunely to provide water for the crops.  Sedimentation was another concern. The 
key solution to these issues was the construction of large dams and their associated 
reservoirs.239 
This said, and from the perspective of environmental sustainability, however, the 
Turkish state purports to be inconsistent with what it manifests on that issue. Specifically, 
the theoretical and administrative background has been carried out and established, but 
some facts on the ground spoil the state’s image on the international level. 
On the international level, two dams on the Tigris River, in the GAP region, Ilisu 
and Cizre, have raised concerns on the part of Iraq in regard to the issue of downstream 
impact. First and foremost, the Environmental Impact Assessment Study (EIAS) for both 
projects is incomplete as it does not take into account downstream problems such as 
adverse water supplies, water quality, erosion, and the ecological impact in Iraq. Despite 
the meetings that have taken place between Turkey and Iraq over water-related issues in 
                                                 
238 Republic of Turkey, “Response to the Final Report of World Commission On Dams,” General 
Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI).  
239 Ozden Bilen, “Prospects for Technical Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin,” in 
International Waters of the Middle East, edited by Asit K. Biswas (Oxford University Press, 1994), 99. 
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the Euphrates basin, the Turkish government refused to speak about the dams.240 
However, construction of the Ilisu dam has been initiated; construction of the Cizre dam 
has not. Moreover, from 1989 up to now, the Turkish state has undertaken twenty-six 
national environmental projects of which twenty-five have been completed; Cizre’s 
environmental project with its EIAS has been ongoing since 1999.241  
Most importantly, the international community, through the words of the 
European Commission and on the basis of Turkey’s candidacy for joining the EU, is 
rather critical of Turkey’s record of dealing with environmental issues as represented by 
the construction of the Ilisu Dam. In regard to environmental protection measures for the 
area to be affected by the dam, Turkey has not taken grave steps. Moreover, the EU 
seems to take a more holistically critical stance towards Turkey’s environmental policies. 
During the screening process of Turkey’s accession, the European Commission noted the 
issues on which Turkey seems awfully inadequate, including its Environmental Impact 
Assessment Directive, dam construction, waste management, environmental protection 
procedures, water quality and international conventions, in addition to EU framework 
directives.242In the case of dams on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, international 
environmental groups such as Friends of the Earth and the World Wildlife Fund have 
been against the GAP project, compelling Turkey to take environmental concerns 
seriously, as linking laws and protection are key requirements of Turkey’s accession to 
the European Union.243 
In the same vein, the Ataturk and Birecik dams’ environmental projects, with their 
respective EIASs have not been mentioned among the nation’s environmental projects in 
the period 1989 to the present, though the dams were completed in 1990 and 1999, 
                                                 
240 Ercan Ayboga, “Report about the Impacts of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) and the Ilisu 
Dam on the Downstream countries Iraq and Syria,” (2009), 12–13.  
241 SU-YAPI Engineering and Consulting Co. in Turkey, “Environmental Projects within the last Ten 
Years.”  
242 Hurriyet Journal, Daily News and Economic Review, Cengiz Aktar, “Environmental Issues and 
tales of Hasankeyf.”  
243 Alexandra M. Pool and Velma I. Grover, “GAPs in the Dialogue of Governance: Conflicting 
Ideologies of Development in Turkey,” in Water: Global Common and Global Problems, edited by Velma 
Grover (Science Publishers, 2006), 382. 
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respectively. Only one such project is mentioned as having been completed during the 
1998–1999 period in the GAP region, which was related to urban sanitation and planning 
only.244  
As far as the Ataturk Dam was concerned, fieldwork and laboratory work were 
conducted between May 1992 and March 1993, and the report was finalized by 1994. 
According to the report, the stock of existing species in the reservoir of the dam was very 
low, so other species were introduced to enrich the fisheries in the dam with very good 
results in reproductive capability.245 However, the report does not mention what the 
initial population and species were before the construction of the dam in order to gauge 
the magnitude of the possible adverse impact caused by the construction of the dam. 
Moreover, in 1996, a report that addressed environmental policies to control 
hillside/shoreline erosion and sedimentation to prevent water quality degradation in the 
reservoir of the dam was neglected; no measures had been taken as of 2002.246 
An evaluation of the above information determines that Turkey seems to have 
taken some regulatory actions to preserve the environment in the GAP region at the level 
of irrigation and infrastructure projects, but not before the construction of the dams, 
which necessarily cause major transformation to their surroundings. Environmental 
projects accompanied, by their respective EIASs, do not seem to be the case for the GAP 
project. The establishment of the Ministry of the Environment and Forestry in 2003, and 
the regulations that followed, indicate that Turkey has not put environmental issues at the 
top of the GAP project agenda. Related international pressure must have played an 
important role in forcing Turkey to proceed with environmental regulations. On the other 
hand, rhetoric of the sort that environmental protection is the responsibility of the nation 
and individual citizens is not consistent with the practices. The reasoning for that  
 
                                                 
244 SU-YAPI Engineering and Consulting Co. in Turkey, “Environmental Projects within the last Ten 
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245 Cecilia Tortajada, “Evaluation of Actual Impacts of the Ataturk Dam,” International Journal of 
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discontinuity is based on the Turkish state’s belief that people are able to develop 
protective sensitivity towards the natural environment only after they have achieved 
higher standards of living.247  
In sum, the environmental protection in the GAP region comes second in priority 
in regard to the socioeconomic objectives of the project. By definition, sustainability 
cannot be achieved if one of its three dimensions lags behind, and this is the case for the 
Southeastern Anatolia region. 
6. Public and Industrial Infrastructure 
a. Public Infrastructure 
There is little doubt that profound changes have been taking place in the 
GAP region, as far as infrastructure is concerned, within the context of social human 
development and sustainability. Due to the rapid rate of urbanization, towns and cities in 
the Southeastern Anatolia region have come under pressure to accommodate the 
incoming rural population, an issue that calls for extensive public construction. In 1985, 
in the GAP region, only 66.8% of rural areas had electricity, while 35.6% had access to 
drinking water.248 
Building roads and industrial and housing projects, and ensuring that the 
dams will be accompanied by water treatment, wastewater and a sewage project, 
constitute the first steps towards upgrading the infrastructure. A number of cities were the 
first in line to benefit from the various related projects. Sewage network implementation 
projects have been completed to some degree in Adiyaman, Batman, Gaziantep, 
Diyarbakir, Mardin, Siirt, Sirnak and Sanliurfa.249 
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The “GAP Region Transport and Infrastructure Project,” dated 1991, 
consists of 134 sub-projects, fully operational and committed to developing sewage, 
drinking water supply, wastewater treatment, solid waste management, electricity and 
telecommunication for some 45 settlements in the GAP region. The first of its kind and a 
very innovative pilot project is the “Treatment of Urban Wastewater in Small and 
Medium Size Settlements and Its Use for Agricultural Irrigation in the GAP Region,” It 
aims at tackling, through recycling, the problems emanating from the heavy pressure put 
on available water resources by rapid population growth, industrialization, uncontrolled 
and unplanned urbanization.250 In addition, there is the “GAP Urban Sanitation and 
Planning Project” with the objective of providing integrated planning for the 
socioeconomic development of the GAP region and ensuring that urban infrastructure can 
cope with steadily growing urban centers and urbanization in the region. The above 
projects are still pilot-scale projects, and it remains to be seen whether and when they will 
be expanded and how much of the GAP region will be covered.251 
Transportation projects and the road network have been developed. There 
are 28,420 km of village roads, of which 26.7% are asphalted, 49.2% stabilized and 
20.7% leveled. Over 98% of villages have been connected to the main road network. The 
196 km Sanliurfa-Gaziantep motorway costing $580 million has been completed and 
constitutes the main transport artery in the region. Also, six airports are operating in 
Adiyaman, Batman, Sanliurfa, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Mardin, and Siirt. These do not 
include the Sanliurfa international cargo airport. Two main railway projects were planned 
in 1991, the 469 km long “Southern line” with a 137 km-long Nizip-Birecik-Sanliurfa 
line, and the “Mardin Free Trade Zone railway.” However, due to resource constraints, 
there has been no spending on the “Southern Line.”252  
In sum, the GAP project has gone far towards fulfilling its promise in 
regard to infrastructure, a trend that continues to characterize the developmental issue of 
the GAP project in other sectors later on in the chapter.  
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b. Industry and Sustainability of the GAP Region 
The development of industry in the region constitutes the very basic 
strategy formulated in the Master GAP Plan. Agro-related industries and those based on 
local resources are the backbone for the promotion of manufacturing.253 Additionally, the 
Master Plan calculated a three-fold increase; this was the conservative scenario, while the 
optimistic one was a five-fold increase in the labor force of the industry by 2005 
compared to the figure of 78,000 in 1985.254 From 1980–85, the manufacturing industry 
of the region contributed only 2% of the nation’s total value-added. In this sector, the 
GAP project demonstrates outstanding results in terms of industrial development (Table 
14) which is promising for economic development. However, industrial development is 
not equally shared among the nine provinces; there seems to be development disparity 
within the region that may inhibit further socioeconomic development in the GAP region 
in the future. Given that the Southeastern Anatolia region (GAP) belongs to the “lagging 
group” in development, the GAP project, according to GAP-RDA, seeks to remove inter-
regional disparities within Turkey within the frame of economic development and social 
stability.255 However, the regional issue of development disparity in Turkey seems to be 
imported as intra-regional (among the nine provinces) within the Southeastern Anatolia 
region (GAP), which contradicts what the GAP seeks and so may jeopardize the broader 
context of the socioeconomic sustainability of the project. 
Since 1982, government actions have emphasized industrial development 
using local agricultural products as raw materials. In particular, incentives were offered to 
encourage the manufacturing industry in the region, with results of high productivity in 
revenues, despite the few numbers of workers. The region aspired to be the supplier of 
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the entire Middle East Market.256 Table 14 gives an account of the development of the 
manufacturing industry in the GAP region, by province, from 1980 to 2009. 
Table 14.   Number of Manufacturing Establishments by Province in the GAP Region 
(1980–2009) 
 
Province Number of Establishments 
1980(1)                       2009(2) 
Gaziantep 4696                            9961 
Diyarbakir 1051                            2913 
Adiyaman 577                              1846 
Sanliurfa 1642                            3908 
Mardin 878                              1283 
Batman 226                               900 
Kilis N/A                              636 
Sirnak 13                                 434 
Siirt 325                               360 
Sources: (1) Kolars and Mitchell, 52–55. (SIS, 1982) and the author’s own calculations 




In 2007, the manufacturing industry was at the top with an allocation of 
34.09% of overall value added factor cost.257 In 2003, the value added was 38.67% and 
in 2004 was 38.32%, while employment in the manufacturing industry reached the fairly 
high levels of 32.64% and 31.82%, respectively, of Turkey’s entire industry.258 The 
master plan of the GAP project estimated an increase in manufacturing employment of 
around 247,000 for the year 2005; however, according to 2002 statistics, the region 
                                                 
256 Kolars and Mitchell, The Euphrates River and Southeast Anatolia Development Project (Southern 
Illinois University, 1991), 47. 
257 Turkish Statistical Institute, Press Release No. 228, “Annual Industry and Service Statistics, 2007.”   
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reached the figure of 88,107.259 In 1985, the GAP provinces accounted for 1.85% of the 
industrial establishments and 1.92% of Turkey’s total industrial labor force.260 In 2002, 
these figures had increased to 5.8% and 4.36%, respectively, due not only to the 
development that took place, but also to the expansion of the GAP project, since 1995, to 
include three more projects to number nine total projects.261 
On the other hand, despite the development in absolute numbers, the GAP 
region suffers an intraregional disparity, which may cause adverse socioeconomic 
development in the region. The provinces of Turkey have been divided into five 
developed regions according to their socioeconomic indicators for potential development 
and growth, and accordingly, have been ranked from the first (best) to fifth (worse) 
degree. With the intensive and dynamic industrialization in recent, years, Gaziantep has 
been referred to as a New Industrial District (NID) is included in the second degree of 
developed provinces. The most important characteristic of this group of provinces is the 
initiation of a rapid development process, primarily in the textiles industry, due to the 
advantage of ample and cheap labor, as a result of the promotion of exports based on the 
outward-oriented development strategy of the state. Diyarbakır and Adıyaman belong to 
the fourth degree of developed provinces. These provinces are generally located around 
the third degree developed provinces and have recently entered into a rapid development 
process based on manufacturing industry activities. It may be said that the fourth degree 
developed provinces group are on the threshold of development.262 The rest of the 
provinces of the GAP region belong to the fifth degree of developed provinces, which 
reflects the lowest values for potential growth, as a result of mass migration, causing 
regression and economic stagnation.263  
                                                 
259 Turkish Statistical Institute.  
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The GAP region (Southeastern Anatolia) as an economic area is ranked 
sixth among the seven geographical regions of Turkey (Aegean, Mediterranean, 
Marmara, Black Sea, Central Anatolia, Southeastern Anatolia, and Eastern Anatolia). 
This is due to factors such as geographical structure, climate characteristics and relative 
distances to developed regional markets, which are the major elements of stagnation.264 
The GAP region is also sixth among seven in the industrial index, with the exception of 
the city of Gaziantep, which stands above the regional level compared to Turkey’s other 
industrial cities as a unit.265 
Gaziantep exports for the first six months of 2010 were $1.7 billion, while 
Siirt province marked a mere $127.6 million.266 The total exports from the GAP region 
amounted to $2.27 billion for the same period.267 The above figures obviously show that 
Gaziantep province bears 74.8% of the total exports of the region, while the other 
provinces share the rest.  
Table 15.   The share of the GAP Region in Turkey’s total exports (2002–2010), % 
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 2008 2009 2010 
% 1.9 2.1 2.5 3,1 2.8 2.8 3.32 N/A 4.25 
Excluding 
Gaziantep 
0.20 0.26 0.44 0.82 0,68 0.69 0.87 N/A 1.07 
Source: SIS, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do and the author’s own calculations. 
*figures of the period 2002-2007: Ahenk Dereli, “Regional Development and Impacts of Regional 
Development Projects in the Light of ‘New Economic Geography’ and Firm Heterogeneity: The Case of 
Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP)” (Thesis, 2008), 57 (Table 3.18). 
 
In sum, the manufacturing industry in the GAP region has grown, but not 
uniformly. Gaziantep city stands out as the most developed, not only within the GAP 
region but also among the major industrial cities of the rest of Turkey. This may cause 
some adverse socioeconomic impact in the region in the future. In-migration from other 
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provinces to Gaziantep will weaken them economically and socially, thus undermining 
the prospects of the GAP project for achieving sustainability. If we look to the objective 
of achieving the projected number of employees in the industry, the project lags behind 
even the conservative scenario. 
7. Health Sector 
Environmental changes resulting from the construction and operation of large 
dams and their associated infrastructure developments, such as irrigation projects, have 
significant adverse effects on the health of the populations living in proximity. Numerous 
vector-borne diseases are associated with large reservoir developments. Moreover, socio-
cultural disruptions may have traumatic effects on the affected populations.268 
The two major vector-borne diseases related to irrigation and water resources 
development in Turkey are schistosomiasis and malaria. Schistosomiasis is a frequently 
occurring disease, but the implementation of large-scale projects may lead to epidemics. 
On the other hand, malaria has long been a significant health problem in Turkey and is 
still common in areas of irrigation and water resources development, as the disease 
exhibits a strong relationship with these developments.269 The highest number of malaria 
cases has been observed in the area where the GAP project has been implemented. Three 
of the major city-regions, where increased incidents of the disease were noted, are 
situated in the GAP region: Diyarbakir, Batman, and Sanliurfa.270 
The constructions of dams, transition to agriculture with the coming of spring, 
temperature, and an increase in humidity, which are all related to the GAP project, 
provide a convenient condition for the reproduction of the malaria parasite. In the city of 
Diyarbakir, the percentage of the infected population was 32.8% but it was brought down 
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to 5.4% in 2000 after the implementation of the state’s medical policies.271 Malaria has 
not been eradicated in Southeastern Anatolia, and is considered a serious disease, as it 
causes death in 20% of cases, especially among very young populations, given that 
48.37% of the population consists of children from 0–14.272 The Turkish Ministry of 
Health implemented a project to combat malaria in the GAP region with outstanding 
results as the project brought a 44.4% decrease in total malaria cases.273  
However, a new, never-before noticed parasite that affects the human intestinal 
system has now made its appearance in the GAP region. A new Community Health 
Project was completed by participating teams from Ege, Dicle, Gaziantep and Harran 
Universities under the Directorate of Turkish Parasitology Association and by the 
Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration between 2001 and 
2003. This was the first investigation of intestinal parasite prevalence in a large region 
such as the GAP region. Preliminary findings confirm the relationship of the new disease 
to the formation of dam ponds, enlargement of irrigation areas, change of product and 
methods of cultivation, urbanization and industrialization, all of which influence humans 
and the environment. In particular, results extracted from feces samples, taken from a 
total of 4,470 individuals, displayed the parasite in the feces of 41.8% of men, 44.3% of 
women and 32.2% of children, from 1–59 months old. This prevalence indicates how 
widespread parasitic diseases are in the region. The high prevalence of parasitic diseases 
in this area is one of the causes of malnutrition in 40% of children. Parasites were 
detected in 44.2% of feces samples taken from rural areas and in 39.5% taken from urban 
areas. When the distribution of parasites detected in feces samples was studied, the most 
common parasites were located in Gaziantep, Batman, Mardin, Diyarbakir, Sirnak and 
Sanliurfa, Siirt, Kilis and Adiyaman.274 
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Beyond the medical health problems in the GAP region, there have been 
increased incidents of mental health problems as a consequence of internal migration. In 
the city of Diyarbakir, high suicide and attempted suicide rates among females are closely 
related to the increasing rate of internal migration. To a lesser degree, the negative social 
status of females living in the GAP region may contribute to suicide. In 2003, another 
study conducted in Batman found that the suicide rate among young women had 
unexpectedly increased in Batman in the 2000s. The suicide rate in Batman was found to 
be four times higher than that of Turkey as a whole. 275  
Since the health sector in the GAP region is significant from the point of view of 
newly emergent diseases and increased rates of suicide added to the existing malaria 
problem, the infrastructure and qualified personnel should be made adequate to meet the 
needs of the affected populations. 
The number of health personnel (physicians, practitioners, dentists, nurses, 
sanitarians, and midwives) per 1,000 people can be considered a measure of accessibility 
to health services. Although there was substantial improvement in health services in the 
GAP region after the year 2000, it has not achieved the projected figures for the year 
2005 and is still much lower than the country averages, as Table 16 indicates. The highest 
increase, roughly 39%, was in the number of practitioners, and the lowest increase, 5.5% 
on average, was in the number of dentists, midwives, and physicians. Moreover, the 
number of hospital beds increased substantially by roughly 36%, while the number of 
nurses increased by 6.4%. Importantly, the number of doctors fell by roughly 10%, but it 
seems the nation has followed a declining trend in the number of doctors. 
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1985*         2000**   2006-7 
GAP 
1985*           2000**       2005276     2006-7 
Doctors 0.718            -            0.45 0.275               -                1.26        0.25 
Nurses 0.613        1.027       1.203 0.362             0.607           1.58       0.646 
Hospital beds 2.06           2.57        2.62 1.18              1.174            2.46         1.6 
Practicians                   0.685      0.781                      0.362                          0.502 
Midwives                  0.612       0.596 0.267            0.367            0.949     0.365 
Dentists                  0.232       0.251                      0.064                           0.073 
Physician                  0.543       0.825                      0.367                           0.383 
Source: TurkStat http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/Bolgesel/sorguSayfa.do?target=degisken and the author’s own 
calculations; *I.H. Olcay Unver, “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” Water Resources Development 
13, no. 4, (1997), 456; **Sibel S. Toybiyik, “The Impact of the Southeastern Anatolia Project on the Inter-
Regional Inequalities in Turkey” (Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2008), 50 (Table 3.13) 
 
In brief, since the health sector falls into the category of human sustainability, 
from the statistics above, two things become obvious: in absolute numbers the GAP 
region lags behind on average 47.4%277 (2007) compared to the nation’s numbers while, 
comparing the progress between the periods 1985–2000 and 2000–2007 within the GAP 
region, the increase in hospital beds and practitioners stands out as the most prominent 
progress, followed by a roughly 6% increase in other medical personnel and a decrease of 
10% in the number of doctors.. In contrast, in terms of hospital beds and qualified 
personnel, the infrastructure has taken precedence over attracting qualified personnel, 
which has fallen short. The bottom line of the above statistics from Table 16 is that the 
projected figures of the year 2005 have not yet been reached. 
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8. Education and Gender Issues in the GAP Region 
Education is part of the program of the GAP project, to raise the literacy level of 
the population of the Southeastern Anatolia region, which in 1985 was 55%.278 
Specifically, the program aims at lifting up the overall status of the female population by 
means of developing productive skills, creating income-generating job opportunities, and 
rendering them active members within the broader context of society in the region. 279   
A study conducted for the GAP region in regard to the issue of the socioeconomic 
status of women in Southeastern Anatolia gives a gloomy impression of their actual 
developmental status. Among 2,203 small-scale local industrial firms in the GAP region, 
only 1% of the employers were women and most of them were illiterate.280 Moreover, in 
only 8% of the firms did females occupy managerial and technical positions, 60% were 
unskilled and the remaining 32% were skilled workers.281 In general, in urban areas of 
the GAP region, women are employed to carry out monotonous jobs in the handmade 
carpet and kilim (rug) weaving industries and are poorly paid due to international 
competition that drives the prices down.282  
A UNDP report related to the Southeast Anatolia region and its socioeconomic 
status, gives a valuable evaluation of the region in terms of labor force, job opportunities 
and female status. In particular, women’s participation in paid labor is an alarming 
3.72%, compared to 19.9% in Turkey as a whole, which is already very low compared to 
EU and other middle-income countries.283 The agricultural labor force is predominantly 
female. The region’s economy is not growing fast enough to create employment 
opportunities for women or men. Lastly, the Southeastern Anatolia region suffers from a 
set of market integration challenges that further constrain opportunities for women’s 
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advancement. Among these is its association with negative events and developments, 
such as social tension. Moreover, national policies for women’s employment are needed 
to overcome structural challenges such as socioeconomic barriers, lack of education, lack 
of business experience, and unequal access to finance and other means of production, all 
of which keep women out of paid employment opportunities, including self-owned 
enterprises.284 For the above reasons, Turkey has received from the UNDP a funded 
project for the period 2008–2011 to enhance women’s empowerment in the region. 
The literacy ratio in the GAP region was as low as 55% in 1985 compared to the 
national rate of 7%, but it reached 68% in 2008.285 Also, the percentage of the literate 
female ratio improved from 39% in 1985 to 60% in 2000.286 As to figures of female 
literacy in 2000, other resources display lower numbers in provinces affected by the 
construction of dams in the GAP project. The population of the affected provinces—
Diyarbakir, Adiyaman, Gaziantep, Mardin and Sanliurfa—was primarily Kurdish. A 
research  project  surveyed  a  total  of  3,871  women  living  in  81  villages  and 
representing 900 households in this region. The women's educational level was very 
low. Seventy‐six point  four percent of  the women were  illiterate. Of  the remaining 
23.6%, 6.3% could only read and write, 16.6% had finished primary school and only 
1% had attended secondary schools.287  
Part of the educational reformation of the GAP region is the related infrastructure. 
In 2000, there was one teacher per 40.55 children (primary school), and, in 2006, one 
teacher  per  36  students.  By  2009, the ratio had improved to one teacher per 28.56 
children in the GAP region. The national figures, respectively, were 26.74, 25, and 22 
children, respectively, for the same years.288 It becomes obvious that the state puts heavy 
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efforts into having more teachers in the GAP region. In elementary schools, where the 
national  average  is  45  children  per  classroom,  there  were  60  to  90  children  per 
classroom in the eastern and southeastern provinces and as many as 80 to 100 per 
classroom in Diyarbakir. (Most schools in the southeast employed a shift schedule to 
accommodate  the  large  numbers.)289  Moreover, the greatest challenges to the 
education system in Southeast Anatolia are the lack of access to schools for rural children 
and the inability of poor families to send their children (particularly girls) to school. 
Seasonal migrants living in villages for only half a year may find it difficult to afford the 
costs of sending their children great distances to attend school, especially when they are 
not in one place for the duration of the school year.290 
As to improving the status of women in the GAP region, since 1994 the state has 
established community centers (CATOMs) to further raise the literacy and productive 
skills of women, as well as to provide them with job opportunities and access to other 
social services. For this reason, seven CATOMs have been operational, engaging 2,000 
women with seven more to have been established by 1997.291 As of 2006, thirty such 
centers were active in all nine provinces of the GAP region reaching out to some 
120,000, and as of 2005, five CATOMs had taken the character of associations to engage 
local youth in cultural and social activities in order to support youth in social 
development.292 In 2005, a process propelled by the state to convert the CATOMs into 
associations had been initiated in five provinces (Batman, Mardin, Adiyaman, Sanliurfa 
and Kilis) to incorporate young people and children, not only females.293 
In brief, the Turkish state has taken serious steps to improve the literacy of the 
populations in the GAP region. In primary schools, there is profound improvement in 
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regard to teacher-to-student ratios, but there is still much to be done in elementary 
schools, which seem to be the most popular among the populations. The education 
challenge will be the issue of accessibility to education for rural children, on the one 
hand, and an affordable cost of education for the populations in the future, on the other. 
The socioeconomic status of female populations in the GAP region is the primary aim of 
the educational program of the GAP project. Since 1994, thirty community centers 
(CATOMs) have been established not only to empower women in the region, but also to 
engage local youth in social development activities. 
9. Analysis and Problems 
I attempted to delineate the progress of the GAP project in the Southeastern 
Anatolia region of Turkey, according to its objectives, as they have been defined in the 
Master Plan and formulated within the context of sustainability.  
According to its objectives, the project can be judged successful in controlling 
migration, but other trends make their appearance that put sustainability into question.  
The trend of out-migration from the GAP region to other regions within Turkey and, in 
particular, the reversing of the trend has been achieved substantially, but not completely.. 
The region still experiences out-migration, but to a reduced rate of roughly 7% compared 
with the rough estimate of 32% shown in Table 6. On the other hand, the rapid 
urbanization of the region is justified on the basis that rural populations migrate from 
rural to urban places, which may be interpreted as a weakening factor of rural areas vital 
for sustainable agricultural production. At this point, the GAP project contradicts what it 
intends to be doing: “….increasing employment opportunities in rural areas.”294 
Moreover, it fails to reverse the internal in-migration trade from rural to urban areas.  In 
particular, “minimizing migration” is one of the objectives of the GAP project that refers 
to rural development.295  
                                                 
294 Carl E. Nestor, “Dimensions of Turkey’s Kurdish Question and the Potential Impact of the 
Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” The International Journal of Kurdish Studies 8, no. 1 (1995), 44. 
295 Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report, 2009,” 38. 
 81
The urbanization of the GAP region, measured against national figures, occurred 
at greater rates for the period 2000–2009: 5.37% for the GAP region and 4% for Turkey 
(Table 8). Additionally, the increase of population in the GAP region for 2000–9 does not 
follow the average increase of 3.56% that occurred during the period 1970–2000 under a 
fertility rate, with an average of 4.5% (Tables 9 and 10). Even though the present data 
cannot securely establish a binary linear relation between the population growth and the 
fertility rate, for the period 2000–2009 the fertility rate in the GAP region dropped to 
around 3% on the basis that the targeted fertility for the region by the year 2005 was 
2.49% after the implementation of the GAP project.296 Moreover, based on 1990 
calculations, the projection of the population of the region for the year 2005 was 10 
million and for the country 71.7 million. However, the GAP region lags behind by 2.54 
million, while the country lags only by some tens of thousands behind the projections 
based on the 2009 population.297 We can infer that since the out-migration was controlled 
after the year 2000, the region’s growth rate should have met, if not surpassed, the above 
projected population figure, given the fertility number of 4.5%, which is not the case. The 
issue of fertility in the Southeastern Anatolia region is a side effect of the urbanization 
process, and it is desirable for the Turkish state from the perspective that births in a 
predominantly Kurdish region come under control and in alignment with national births. 
In regard to the microeconomic indicators of GDP per capita, unemployment, and 
poverty, the GAP region provides a rather gloomy picture. In absolute numbers, the 
region’s GDP has grown nine-fold. Compared to the nation’s GDP per capita, however, it 
is declining as a percentage. Specifically, the region’s GDP per capita rose from 47.18% 
(1988) to 55.26% (2001) for the period 1988–2001 (Table 12). This rise was cross-
checked by two different sources, though for the period 2001–2009, there is a lack of 
statistics to securely establish that the growth still persists. However, for the year 2007–
2008, the region’s GDP per capita of 42.97% shows that it was much lower than that of 
the year 1988 (Table 12). This, in conjunction with the GAP-RDA (2006) referring to the 
same period of GDP per capita growth, may be interpreted as a declining trend began 
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after 2001 and continuing to the present time.. If this is true, then it must be said that 
Turkey, during the period 1988–2001 suffered two major economic crises (1994 and 
2001), though the GAP region presented positive tendency for growth. On the other hand, 
during the period 2001–9, Turkey was faced with the 2007–2008 economic crisis, though 
growth in the GAP region was in decline. The point here is that in better economical 
times, the GAP region was on decline, which puts into question the issue of the economic 
sustainability of the GAP region. Even though the above argument cannot be totally 
convincing by itself, the indicators of unemployment and poverty in the GAP region may 
buttress it.  
Since 1980, the GAP region has been experiencing an increasing rate of 
unemployment compared to national rates, which means that the project has not 
alleviated the trend. Only during the initial phase of the implementation of the GAP 
project (1995–2000) was unemployment at a standstill (Table 13), relative increase for 
the years 1995 to 2000), while during 2000–2005 it started a mild decline, which was 
exacerbated from 2005 to 2009 (see Table 13). Different sources on unemployment are 
consistent with an increasing pattern pinpointing the estimated figure of 21% on average. 
Among young people in the cities of Southeastern Turkey, unemployment often reaches 
50–60%.298 
Unemployment accompanies a rise in poverty in the GAP region. Taken together, 
they provide an explanation for the declining GDP per capita and, at the same, time put 
into ambiguity the sustainability of the region. The GAP project is supposed to raise the 
level of income and living standards of people in the region,299 though it conspicuously 
failed to achieve this objective after the year 2005.  
However, the state has launched job and profession consultancy services, as well 
as community work programs, to increase employment in the region covered by the 
South-Eastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Program, which has initiated the 
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“GAP-2 Project” for the 2008–2012 period. Within the context of the project, 795 
unemployed have benefited from these services using the financial resources of 312,926 
TL as of 2008. On the other hand, as of October 2009, 11,951 unemployed attended the 
programs by taking advantage of the wider budget opportunities, 23,449,612 TL.300 
However, it is not known how many of those who attended the program found a job. 
In the sector of infrastructure and industry, the GAP project demonstrates 
outstanding achievements. In particular, tremendous progress has been achieved so far in 
transportation/communication investments. In 2002, realization of these investments was 
33.7%.301 In 2006, 98% of the villages in the region were connected to the main road 
network, the Gaziantep-Sanliurfa motorway, including the Gaziantep ring road which 
was realized by 73%.302 However, a new report states that 82.74% (186km out of 226km) 
was realized by the year 2009.303 Economy Minister Ali Babacan asserted that the 
construction of an airport in Batman304 province would be completed by 2010. The 
Şırnak airport, for which a tender of construction was recently launched increasing the 
number of airports in the GAP region from 7 to 8, will also play a massive role in 
sparking economic activities in the disadvantaged regions of the country.305 The 
motorway connecting Mersin harbor to Sanliurfa, initially planned to be completed in 
2007, was only tendered for the year 2010 due to feasibility.306 
The manufacturing industry in the GAP region has demonstrated great 
developments, but a trend of intraregional economic disparity emerged (see Table 14). 
From the nine provinces of the GAP region, only four (Adiyaman, Diyarbakir, Sanliurfa, 
and Gaziantep) have dynamics for further improvement and productivity. Moreover, of 
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the four provinces, only Gaziantep displays great dynamics for a full-fledged industrial 
city as it bears three-fourths of the share of the GAP region in Turkey’s total exports (see 
Table 15). The establishment of irrigation networks in Sanliurfa province has increased 
the agricultural output and benefited the province the most. Nonetheless, increased 
agricultural output has not brought the desired socioeconomic development, and thus, 
benefiting larger population groups in the province.307 Most of the agricultural output is 
either sold domestically or exported as raw materials.308 Thus, the agro-based industry in 
the province of Sanliurfa is presently at the lower levels of the value chain, which 
impedes socioeconomic growth. Except for Gaziantep, all the provinces are characterized 
as being in the low-chain/low-paid industrial sector, using unskilled/low paid labor for 
manufacturing units for larger companies in Western Turkey. 309 The paradox of 
industrial development, which does not fall within the scope of the paper, is that the GAP 
project developed those provinces that already had a developmental advantage in regards 
to the rest in 1985 (Table 14).  
In the same vein of infrastructure and industry development, the health and 
education sectors display a high realization with 85% of the investments (2002).310 From 
Table 15 we infer that the state put heavy stress on the construction of hospitals rather 
than employing adequate numbers of personnel to staff them. The same trend continues 
to persist from the year 2008 up to now on the basis of new investments announced by 
the government for the period 2008–2012 (GAP 2008 Action Plan). In particular, two 
new hospitals are under construction in Diyarbakir and Mardin cities, one new hospital 
was completed in 2008 in Hakkari city, into which heavy investment has been poured 
since 2003 for construction of 90 schools and waterworks for the whole province.311  
Nonetheless, the health status of the region, especially of the female population, 
seems to have been seriously affected because of the adverse impact to the surrounding 
                                                 
307 UNDP, “Industrial Restructuring of Sanliurfa Project (Technical Assistance Component),” (2008)  
308 UNDP, “Industrial Restructuring of Sanliurfa Project (Technical Assistance Component),” (2008) 
309 UNDP, “Industrial Restructuring of Sanliurfa Project (Technical Assistance Component),” (2008)   
310 Elmas, “Women, Urbanization and Regional Development in Southeast Anatolia 5, no. 3 (2004), 5 
(Table 1) 
311 Sunday’s Zaman, “Changing face of Eastern Anatolia,”  
 85
environment due to dam construction in the GAP project. Diseases that already existed, 
such as schistomiasis and malaria, multiplied. The state controlled them, but has not yet 
eradicated them. Also, new diseases such as intestinal parasites have appeared. The state 
seems to be ignorant of the fact that they are side effects of the dams. The state was 
successful at bringing them under control, though it does not seem to behave pro-actively 
in dealing with diseases as actual effects of dam construction. Significantly, the issue of 
suicide rates in the GAP region demonstrates the difficulty of adapting to urban 
environments on the part of villagers who have to abandon their villages for the sake of 
dam construction. 
The educational sector seems to be doing well, as it goes far beyond 
infrastructural achievements and has centered its attention on female empowerment in the 
region. However, the sector presents a problem relating to the issue of absorbing trained 
personnel into the region’s job market. Specifically, the educational program of the GAP 
project attracts thousands of females as attendants of the established community centers 
(CATOMs), but the number of women actually finding a job is extremely low, which 
puts into question the effectiveness of the centers in providing women with the skills 
necessary to enable them to find a job. In 2005, from 120,000 women attending 
CATOMs activities, only 817 women found employment in the GAP region.312 In 2009, 
1,495 women were employed in a variety of jobs from atelier to restaurant chains to 
fashion textiles.313  
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The GAP project seems to have achieved positive results in some of its objectives 
through the period 1989–2009. Migration and infrastructure in education, health, industry 
and public services are the objectives that show general improvement to varying degrees; 
out-migration and infrastructure present the highest degrees of improvement after the 
year 2000. Attracting qualified personnel has showed the lowest improvement, primarily 
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in the health sector and, secondarily, in education. In the health sector particularly, in a 
few cases there have been negative results—for example, in the number of doctors and 
midwives during the period 2000–2007. 
On the other hand, the employment objective has not been met and actually 
worsened after the year 2000. Unemployment in the GAP region has been at an all-time 
high, despite its stabilization during 1995–2000, a period that falls within the first 
operating years of the GAP project. It has not reversed since then. Even the period before 
the year 1989 had not shown numbers as high as 17.4%, with an estimated tendency for 
the year 2010 of around 21%. This issue is of critical significance, as it is linked with 
poverty and income (GDP per capita), which relate to the economic dimension of 
sustainability in the Southeastern Anatolia region. 
The poverty rate worsened during 2006–2008 and the GDP per capita for 2007–
2008 declined as a relative percentage of the nation’s GDP per capita to a degree worse 
than before the year 1989. Taking together unemployment, poverty, and the GDP per 
capita, the GAP project does not seem to have improved the economic dimension of 
sustainability and the economic well-being of the people in the region. 
The social dimension of sustainability, defined within the narrow context of the 
economic status of the region and the objectives of the project, follows the same course. 
Despite the control of out-migration, the project did not reverse in-migration from rural to 
urban areas. Abandoning rural areas and migrating to cities, the population is faced with 
problems of adaptation to the new city life-style and environment, which  become 
obvious with the increased suicide rate among females migrating from their villages and 
the diseases caused by the construction of dams. Moreover, the rise in poverty and 
unemployment inhibit them from having access to affordable education. The community 
centers (CATOMs), which aim to empower the female and youth populations of the 
region, seem only to occupy the populations with activities, giving few skills, though they 
may provide a sort of cultural assimilation. Nonetheless, an unskilled population with the 
characteristics of poor education, a health status depending on migration and dam effects, 
and unskilled, is not a social well-being status.  
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The environmental dimension of sustainability, in factual terms, seems to lag 
behind its vision at the theoretical and administrative levels. It seems that certain dams in 
the GAP region were constructed without their EIASs, while environmental projects for 
the GAP region, with regard to mitigating the adverse transformation of nature by dam 
constructions are absent. The issue is problematic in the cognitive approach that the 
Turkish state takes towards the environment. It gives priority to higher standards of living 
that will trigger environmental sensitivity. 
That said, the GAP project has demonstrated a tendency to improve numbers and 
physical achievements in terms of infrastructure within its objectives, but it has not 
achieved its overarching aim of sustainability. 
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IV. THE GAP PROJECT AND TURKEY’S ACCESSION TO EU: 
PROSPECTS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to conclude this assessment on the GAP project, this chapter will touch 
upon issues—at the international level—of specific gravity for the EU and its candidate 
members. First, even though the GAP project takes place in the Southeastern Anatolia 
region of Turkey, it has implications for the rest of the riparian states—Syria and Iraq 
share the rivers too—and Turkey, itself, in terms of regional stability, which is of primary 
concern for the EU goal of secure borders and stability. The second issue is the human 
rights of ethnic minorities and the way states address them in alignment with the 
Copenhagen political criteria of rule of law, protection, and respect for minorities. Since 
the Southeastern Anatolia region is predominantly inhabited by Kurdish populations, this 
chapter will examine the Turkish state’s attitude towards the population in the region 
affected by the GAP project within this context. It must be noted that Turkey has met 
adverse criticism in regard to the issue of human rights from the EU, and that issue was 
an inhibitor to the process of Turkey’s accession to EU.  
Moreover, the chapter argues that on the issue of regional stability, the relations 
of the three riparian states are not at their best, especially between Turkey and Iraq. 
Turkey uses the dams of the GAP project as a tool to exert pressure on Iraq to achieve 
political goals in respect to the PKK insurgency, which operates from the northern part of 
Iraq.  
In addressing the above two issues, the chapter will first examine the extent to 
which the GAP project contributes to stability in the region by focusing on tensions 
among the states as a result of dam construction and corollary environmental issues. 
Secondly, it will examine the living standards of Internally Displaced People (IDP) as 
result of the construction of dams in the GAP project and progress in mitigation measures 
adopted by the Turkish state within the context of human rights. 
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B. THE GAP PROJECT AND REGIONAL STABILITY 
1. Initialization of the GAP: The First Crisis (1975) 
There is extensive literature on water wars and conflicts as well as differences of 
opinions whether water-related issues have the potential to cause future wars. Even the 
Arab-Israeli war is being approached from a different angle by scholars as they attribute 
the war to reasons of territorial and water sovereignty, essentials for Israeli state survival. 
In the case of the Euphrates-Tigris basin, the GAP dams played important roles in the 
international relations of the states of the basin. 
In the hydrological scenery of the basin, Turkey occupies an upstream position on 
both rivers—the Euphrates and the Tigris—with a major portion of the rivers springing 
up within Turkey. The Euphrates River flows southeast across the common border with 
Syria to enter Syrian land and continue its flow through Iraqi land until it ultimately 
reaches the Arabian Gulf. Though the Tigris does not cross Syrian land, it forms a hydro-
physical common border between Turkey and Syria for 32 km, and then enters Iraq to 
later join the Euphrates and ultimately reach the Gulf.314 Therefore, Turkey is upstream 
of Syria and Iraq, Syria as a middle-stream is upstream of Iraq and downstream of 
Turkey, and Iraq is downstream of both states. A bit more than 88% of the Euphrates’ 
flow is contributed by Turkey; Syria contributes less than 12% to the flow, while Iraq 
contributes none.315 Turkey and Iraq contribute roughly 50% each to the Tigris flow, 
while Syria contributes none.316 From the above, it can be inferred that Syria depends 
heavily on the Euphrates, Turkey is rich in water resources, Iraq is totally dependent on 
both rivers, and all three states need the rivers for irrigation, electricity production and 
internal consumption for domestic and industrial use. 
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Since the 1950s, both Turkey and Syria have embarked on ambitious projects 
based on irrigation and electricity generation, with Iraq following suit. The total amount 
of planned water utilization by the three riparian states exceeds the total flow capacity of 
the Euphrates by 49% of the available water.317 The first conflict surrounding this 
problem occurred with the construction of the Keban and Karakaya dams in the 1960s 
and 1970s in Turkey.318 It should be noted, that from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
in 1918 until the 1970s, there was little or no friction between the three states over water 
usage; instead, there was a degree of cooperation in terms of protecting the national 
interests of upstream and downstream states. The Keban and Karakaya dams were the 
first of the known GAP project dams to be built, and they had a huge capacity to impound 
substantial water volume from the Euphrates. This action, coupled with the fact that it 
was launched unilaterally by Turkey, alarmed the downstream states, Syria and Iraq. The 
alarming factor was the structural shift of hydropower away from them and towards 
Turkey; literally speaking, it was a shift in waterpower. That frustrated the downstream 
states and spurred among them competition and conflict later on, as Mark Reisner has 
said “Water flows towards power and money.”319 However, the medium for such shifts 
of power was provided by the dams. In response and countermeasures to the impounding 
of Euphrates water in the upper Euphrates, Syria started unilaterally with the construction 
of the Syrian Tabqa Dam (1968–1973). The accrued result of the Turkish and Syrian 
dams was a substantial decrease in the Euphrates’ flow downstream to Iraq. The Iraqis 
requested more water be allowed to pass through the Tabqa Dam because the flow of the 
river had been reduced to one third of its natural volume. Despite the agreement, the 
Iraqis and the Syrians disputed the actual quantity reaching Iraqi soil, and a barrage of 
hostile statements was exchanged.320 Then the situation escalated when the two countries 
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closed each others’ airline offices and airspace, and sent troops to their common border, 
with the Iraqis threatening to bomb the dam.321 The crisis was averted only after a 
mediation led by the Soviets and Saudis.322 
Syrians were the most worried by the upstream damming of the Euphrates by the 
Turks, giving them control over the flow of water that was Syria’s prime source of 
electric power and irrigation water.323 The filling of both the Keban and Tabqa dams and, 
concomitantly, the extraction of water from the Euphrates coupled with the severe 
drought of 1970–75, brought Syria and Iraq to the verge of war.324 Paradoxically, neither 
country condemned Turkey for the Keban Dam contribution to the decreasing flow. This 
may be interpreted as a well-organized attempt, by Turkey, to provide convincing data to 
the states to the opposite effect. Indeed, before the outbreak of the crisis, during the 
period 1962–1974, there were thirteen negotiating rounds between Iraq and Turkey 
confined simply to exchanging hydrologic data, none of which resulted in any agreement. 
Similarly, from 1962 to 1971, four such rounds took place between Turkey and Syria for 
the same purpose.325 However, the crisis of 1974 broke out between Syria and Iraq with 
both having been convinced that the Keban filling did not play a significant role in the 
decrease of the flow.326 Only after the construction of the fourth dam, Ataturk, which 
provoked the second crisis in the basin later on, this time between Turkey and Syria, 
would the impact of large dams on the upper Euphrates in Turkey be revealed within the 
context of the GAP water development project. 
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2. Amidst GAP Project: The Second Crisis (1990)     
During 1980–1990, water interests intertwined with national security, resulting in 
two water protocols—one between Turkey and Syria and one between Syria and Iraq—in 
regard to the issue of minimum allocation of water. Again, the paradox of this period 
compared to the previous one was that despite the three countries having reached an 
agreement, the second crisis, precipitated by the filling of the Ataturk Dam in Turkey, 
was not averted. 
Following the 1974 crisis, a cooperation framed by bilateral and trilateral 
committees was mainly characterized by concerns over the launch of the GAP project on 
the part of Syria and Iraq. The process of cooperation did not result in any agreement; 
instead, tensions started over again with the construction of Turkey’s Karakaya Dam in 
1984.327 As none of the three states had reached an agreement on the flow of the 
Euphrates River after the first crisis, a special event was seized by Syria as a bargaining 
tool in water negotiations. Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia region had been the venue for 
clashes between a Kurdish separatist movement and the Turkish army. Syria played the 
“Kurdish card,” according to Turkish allegations, by harboring and training the 
separatists to gain a compromise on the water issue.  Indeed, Turkey agreed in the 
protocol of 1987 to guarantee a minimum annual flow of 500 cubic m/sec as a trade-off 
of ensuring Syrian collaboration on border security and abandoning support for the 
separatists.328 This agreement boosted a further bilateral agreement in 1990 between 
Syria and Iraq to share the 500 cm/sec of water in the proportion 290 cubic m/sec for 
Syria and the rest for Iraq.329  
However, the optimism over establishing a cooperative regime vanished into thin 
air when Turkey diverted water from the Euphrates to fill up the Ataturk Dam, a process 
that lasted a month. Syria and Turkey were once again on the brink of war.330 Despite the 
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fact that Turkey did this during winter when water consumption was lowest and 
broadcast an advisory, Syria and Iraq accused Turkey of creating a de facto situation by 
completing these dams. Iraq requested that Turkey reduce the amount of time needed to 
fill the Ataturk Reservoir Dam, but to no avail.331 Once again, negotiations started but 
proved to be futile as Turkey started building the Birecik Dam in 1992 amidst efforts to 
persuade Syria not to support Kurdish separatists. The dispute between Turkey and Syria, 
intimately linked with the Kurdish issue for so many years, spiked again in October 1998 
with a military showdown between the two countries. However, Syria’s agreement to end 
its support for the separatists and its handing of Ocalan,  the leader of the Kurdish 
separatist movement, over to Turkey, eased tensions from Syria’s concern over reactions 
from the U.S., a strategic ally of Turkey.332 Ocalan’s delivery seemed to restore Syria-
Turkey relations, as both states again concluded a protocol of security in which Syria 
explicitly pledged not to support the Kurdish separatist movement in any way. However, 
the benefit was to Turkey, as Syria lost its trump card and the credibility to disrupt the 
implementation of the GAP project.333 The restoration of their relationship in 2004 was 
earmarked by the establishment of technical cooperation at the administrative level 
between the Turkish GAP and Syrian GOLD334 project development administrations and 
by mutual visits paid by Turkish and Syrian leaders to discuss water issues relating to 
further use of the Tigris River.335 
3. Environmental Concerns 
Even if the relationship of environment and international conflict or cooperation 
has not yet been proved, it seems there is an underlying notion that local or regional 
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instability arises from a combination of environmental and political factors and may 
escalate to the international level and become violent.336 Major water development 
projects have adverse effects on downstream users and ecosystems, including changes in 
control of local resources and economic dislocations, all of which may lead to disputes on 
a local level or across borders.337 The GAP project, as one such water development, has 
caused growing and so far, unresolved, tensions among the three riparian states.338 The 
Euphrates-Tigris basin is coming under increasing population, irrigation, and energy 
pressures and their concomitant conflicts, especially over sources for extensive irrigation 
programs. All of these may become particularly severe on the basis of an urgent demand 
to meet food needs.339  
Moreover, it has been hypothesized that in the future “environmental scarcities” 
of renewable resources will increase sharply. If they become severe, they could induce 
violent civil or international conflicts.340 The term “environmental scarcity” encompasses 
three elements: climate change, population growth, and the unequal distribution of water 
resources.341 Since river water flows from one area to another, one country’s access can 
be affected by another’s actions. Conflict is most probable when downstream riparians 
are highly dependent on river water. Downstream riparians often fear that their upstream 
neighbors will use water as a means of coercion. This situation is particularly dangerous 
if downstream countries believe they have the military power to remedy the situation.342 
The GAP water development project fits into the “environmental scarcity and 
conflict scenario.” By examining the three elements and the extent to which they play a 
role in the aforementioned crisis among the three states, it becomes obvious that both of 
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the crises of 1974 and 1990 occurred during extreme droughts; 1970–1975 and 1990–
1993 satisfy the criterion of climate change. Moreover, the unequal distribution criterion 
was met, as Turkey is the richest and Syria the poorest in regard to the two rivers. Only 
the third criterion of population growth needs a projection to the future. Indeed, 
projections for the year 2050 predict an increase in the population of the Euphrates-Tigris 
basin of 100%, with 53.4% coming from Turkey alone.343 The population growth 
scenario counts only for the future and not the current conflict. Therefore, the scenario for 
the future becomes scarier, as the present conflict was based only on the first two 
elements. 
Additionally, it can be said that the GAP project, viewed only as a physical 
structure, a network of dams, contributes to environmental scarcity. In particular, the 
accrued surface water of the reservoirs of the GAP increases water evaporation, which 
means losses in actual water.344 If we take into account both the volume of the water 
impounded behind the reservoirs and the evaporation, a basin rich in water is transformed 
into a basin of scarce water. 
There are also secondary issues that have not emerged as potential indicators for 
conflict, but it is argued that environmental degradation will take first place in the 
political agenda of the governments as such issues cannot be solved without cooperation. 
Degraded water quality and salts contribute to reduced agricultural production, which 
constitutes one of many factors contributing to “environmental scarcity.” The case of the 
Balikh and Khabour rivers is very interesting in this regard. Due to extensive irrigation 
within Turkey, these rivers will experience an increase in their flow, caused by 
augmentation of drainage water, to the benefit of Syria. However, the crucial problem is 
the quantity of salt that these waters will carry. Currently their salinity value of 700ppm 
is roughly at the critical limit of moderate quality. If the salinity value increases, it will 
have an adverse economic impact on Syria as the land cultivated in the rivers will 
experience low crop yields, which will eventually lead to the abandonment of 
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cultivation.345 As more and more irrigation projects come on line in Turkey, the pollution 
of the Balikh and Khabir rivers, which are tributaries to the Euphrates, will increase; in 
conjunction with the reduced flow of the Euphrates River, this will lead to greater 
concentrations of dissolved solids downstream.346  
There is considerable evidence that Iraq has already experienced a rise in the 
salinity of the water it gets from Turkey, directly or through Syria, so much so that in the 
city of Basra, much of the irrigated land is lost due to excessive salinity. Both Syria and 
Iraq are adamant about protecting not only their quantitative, but also their qualitative 
shares. This issue will affect both the shape of the future Iraqi entity that will emerge 
after the U.S. leaves Iraq, and Turkey’s entry into the European Union.347 
Given the current environmental issues, the future emerges uncertain in regard to 
the final impact the completion and full operation of all the projects and dams the GAP 
project will have on the flow of the Euphrates River. Since 1991, scholars have predicted 
that the full implementation of the GAP project will put an increasingly dramatic strain 
upon the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.348  
Indeed, a study using the Water Evaluation Planning System (WEAP) model to 
simulate the possible water demand scenarios on the Euphrates is quite discouraging. The 
model simulated the operation of six dams—three of the GAP project, two Syrians, and 
one Iraq—-and compared the water demand of the model to that of a full development 
scenario of the GAP project. The results showed that the monthly water demand in the 
full GAP development scenario is significantly higher than the model’s and, in addition, 
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there will be an unmet future demand of 50% of the current usage.349 The model 
estimates water scarcity without counting the Tigris River, but it is unknown whether 
Tigris waters will be diverted into the Euphrates in the future to make up any lag in water 
demand among the riparian states, since the Tigris River is of paramount importance to 
the Iraqi state, as will be shown later on. 
Another study conducted on both rivers corroborates the above estimates and is 
even more specific about the hydrological risks that both Syria and Iraq may be facing in 
the future should the GAP project become fully operational. Specifically, the study 
demonstrated that under full completion of the GAP, the Euphrates flow will be reduced 
further, to 32% from the current 17%, and Tigris flow to 25% from the current 20%. 
Significantly, these further reductions negatively affect Turkey’s commitment to its 
neighbors to provide the agreed amount of water of 500 cubic m/sec, as the amount can 
only be provided 75% of the time in the Euphrates River.350 
4. Post-2000 Relations Between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq: The GAP 
Determines Cooperation Under the Threat of Coercion 
Despite the fact that Turkey supported claims about the benefits of the GAP 
project to regulate the extremely high variance of both rivers’ water flow and diminishing 
the effect of siltation downstream due to dams upstream, Syria and Iraq raised serious 
concerns about the project, as it affected their national aspirations.351 In particular, Syria 
complained about the dwindling resources both of the Euphrates inflow and Syria’s 
groundwater, which curtail its agricultural development and cause severe food 
shortages.352 Moreover, the risk of not meeting its electricity needs from the electricity 
production of the Tabqa Dam will rise from the current risk of 16% to a high of 60% in 
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the future.353 Even more sensitive has been the situation in Iraq, which has a larger 
population than Syria and lies further downstream. The northwestern part of Iraq, as a 
wheat and rice producing area, has been vulnerable to reduced flows, so the only solution 
for Iraq is to make use of the Tigris, but the huge hydroelectric Ilisu Dam, soon to be 
completed, will cause a reduction in the river’s flow.354 
However, it seems that Turkey has changed its behavior by adopting a more 
cooperative approach towards issues related to water, a fact that has become conspicuous 
in the country’s bilateral relations with Syria. Despite the fact that the restoration of a 
Turkey-Syria relationship was highlighted by the delivery of the Kurdish leader Ocalan in 
1999, it took quite a long time for Turkey to take the initiative. Implicitly, Turkey may 
have become conscious of the real problems that the GAP project has caused and may 
want to remedy past faults. This is not the real reason, as doing so would legitimize the 
negative effects of the GAP, something that Turkey has never admitted, so far. On the 
contrary, it has to do with Syria’s posture against the Syrian Kurdish population in 
conjunction with the security implications for Turkey in the Kurdish Northern part of 
Iraq. If these two issues are taken together, they can explain the discriminatory attitude of 
Turkey—for Syria and against Iraq—and the role of the GAP project in the second case. 
In brief, Syria had commenced a project similar to the GAP, the Euphrates Basin 
Development Project (EBDP), in the northern part of Syria just adjacent to the common 
southeastern border between Turkey and Syria. The initialization of the project was 
marked by the construction of the Tabqa Dam in 1974, which was ranked tenth in the 
world largest dams at that time. Its aim was to bring economic prosperity to the mixed 
Kurdish in majority and some Arab and Armenians, as well as to the whole country, and 
was achieved by the mid 1990s.355 From 2002 through 2005, the Syrian state adopted a 
discriminatory attitude toward the Kurdish population in the area of the EBDP project on 
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issues of land, access to resources, and loans. It even precluded them from starting any 
economic enterprises.356 In parallel, in 2001, the two neighbors agreed to cooperate on 
the GAP project, but under the terms determined by the then Turkish Deputy Prime 
Minister, Mesut Yilmaz:  
We do not want to be in conflict with Syria and we do appreciate the role 
played by Damascus in expelling members of the Kurdistan Workers 
Party, but the Euphrates reservoir is very important for the future of 
economic development in Turkey […] We have completed work on 
almost 50% of the infrastructure and we are in the meantime working in 
the final stages and we will extend the invitation to Syria to accept the 
inevitability of this project and to join negotiations on a rational use of 
waters. We are ready to deal fairly and generously, but the division of 
waters will not be equal as the Euphrates, like any other Turkish river, 
should be basically used for serving the interests of the Turkish people.  
In 2002, Turkey and Syria signed a Memorandum of Understanding that 
established joint research over irrigation and agricultural plans. The shared characteristic 
of both the GAP and EBDP projects is that the Kurds, on either side of the Turkey-Syria 
border, have never been informed or consulted about proposed development plans for the 
Euphrates.357 
That said, the year 2007 officially marked a shift in Turkish water policy in the 
basin to a fair-sharing model promising to solve the problems it had with Syria and Iraq. 
This shift was heralded by the words of Environment and Forestry Minister Veysel 
Eroglu, who said, “No war over water resources will emerge in the region.” In March 
2007, Turkey solved its problems with Syria by undertaking, in common, joint projects 
for the construction of dams in the basin and a provision for Syria with substantial 
scientific support on irrigation techniques. Furthermore, a joint scientific committee was 
assembled and discovered that evaporation in Syria is at high levels and that Syria does 
not have suitable terrain for storing water; therefore, it would be more reasonable to store 
water in Turkish territories. Accordingly, Syria was convinced that Turkey's construction 
of more dams would, in the long term, be beneficial to Syria, a fact that compelled Syria 
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to stop objecting to the Ilısu Dam.358 The first project both countries agreed on, in 
principle, to develop was the Asi Friendship Dam, to be built on the Orontes River on the 
border between Syria and Turkey. The Orontes River originates in Syria and flows 
through Turkey. A Turkish team of technical experts went to Syria to start working on 
mapping and feasibility studies.359 Eroglu has gone beyond emphasizing only this project 
by stating that the GAP project could be expanded to include Syria, offering  optimism 
that both states would have even closer cooperation.360 
On the other hand, Turkey-Iraq relations are not being played out as smoothly as 
the Turkey-Syria rapprochement. Iraq experienced a grave situation in 2009, when a 
rapidly falling flow in the Euphrates River for three weeks caused a fall in electricity 
production in the south of Iraq by 50%, leaving up to 2 million people without electricity. 
In Basra, a suburb north of the city was evacuated by its 3,000 people, as they could no 
longer drink the extremely saline water. Iraq's water minister, Dr. Abdul Latif Rashid, 
estimated that up to 300,000 marshland residents in south Iraq were on the move, many 
of them newly uprooted and heading for nearby towns and cities that could do little to 
support them. He said that in the last 20–30 years, neighboring countries had built a 
number of structures for collecting water or diverting water for their agricultural lands, 
while the amount used for Iraqi agriculture’s purposes had fallen by 50%.361 This dire 
situation contradicts a water forum held in March 2009, in Turkey, under the theme 
“Bridging Divides for Water,” where Turkey was purported to have established a level of 
mutual confidence with both Baghdad and Damascus and set the conditions for a Peace 
Water Project.362  
Iraq is a very special case for Turkey to deal with. They share a common feature, 
the Kurdish populations inhabiting both countries—Southeastern Anatolia in Turkey and 
the northern part of Iraq—that form a common border between Turkey and Iraq. Military 
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clashes between the Kurdish separatist movement and the Turkish army are still ongoing, 
with the separatists launching their attacks mainly from northern Iraq. Turkey has always 
feared the scenario of the Kurds succeeding in creating an independent Kurdish state in 
Iraq, which might have a spillover effect on the Southeastern Anatolia region in 
Turkey.363 Within the context of American troop withdrawals and analysts’ estimation 
that Iraqi Kurdistan is effectively a separate state—with little violence and an effective 
administration—that has rapidly developed over the last few years,364 Turkey uses water 
power as a coercive political tool towards Iraq. It came as no surprise when during the 
bilateral talks that took place in Baghdad in August 2009 between Turkey and Iraq, 
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu promised that Turkey would increase the 
amount of the Euphrates water flowing into Iraq and would help with technology to 
increase the amount of Iraq’s usable water. In exchange, Iraq would commit to clamping 
down on attacks by Kurdish rebels from Iraq into Turkey.365 This is the second time that 
Turkey has asked for suppression of the PKK. The first time Turkey asked for it from the 
Prime Minister of Kurdish Northern Iraq, Barzani, but it is difficult to expect Barzani to 
order Kurds to fight against Kurds.366 
5. Conclusions 
It is obvious that the regime in the basin has changed from conflict to cooperation, 
though there are subtle nuances undermining the cooperative regime, which render it 
unstable and susceptible to conflict. In particular, if the basin is viewed from the 
perspective of physical constructions—dam construction—the likelihood of conflict 
increases and reaches the level of military mobilization. A basin without treaties and low 
dam density is being characterized as a conflict-prone basin,367 which is best described 
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by the two prior crises of 1974 and 1990. Though the second crisis was precipitated 
because Turkey did not meet the criterion of the agreement, after the protocols signed by 
Turkey, Syria and Iraq, the basin was transformed to one with treaties. Thus, it is ranked 
as a cooperative basin. However, the basin is still at risk because, according to Wolf, 
treaties must be signed between pairs of states.368 Therefore, the basin includes two 
treaties—one between Turkey and Syria, and one between Syria and Iraq—but there is no 
treaty between Turkey and Iraq. Moreover, these treaties apply to the Euphrates River 
and not to the Tigris River; on the other hand, dam constructions on the river are ongoing 
with the most controversial being the Ilisu Dam. This dam makes this part of the basin a 
place with high dam density without treaties, which is ranked much higher on the conflict 
scale.369 In analogy to the military mobilization that occurred in the two crises, it should 
have re-occurred between Turkey and Iraq, but Iraq is the weakest state of the three. 
Moreover, Turkey discriminates, cooperating with Syria while it exerts political pressure 
on Iraq by using the GAP to offer more water in a quid pro quo with Iraq and clamping 
down on the PKK in its northern part. Because considered coercion exacerbates the 
situation on the Tigris side of the basin, it remains to be seen whether Iraq will in turn use 
the Kurdish card against Turkey, as Syria did. If this scenario occurs, then we will see a 
repetition of what happened between Turkey and Syria in the past years. 
A second flashpoint is the environmental issue that, irrespective of dam 
constructions, burdens the basin with environmental conflict. On that issue, there have 
been no treaties or measures taken by any country in the basin to remedy the situation.  
In terms of international relations, it seems that from the status of raw anarchy, 
where all three actors had to fend for themselves, the basin passed to a mature anarchy 
with some common regimes. However, it still lags far behind a secure community status 
where violence is an unthinkable way of resolving conflicts between states.370 
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C. THE GAP REGION AND THE COPENHAGEN CRITERIA: THE CASE 
OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDP) 
The European Union (EU) pays particular attention to meeting the political 
criteria on the part of its member or would-be member states. These criteria are 
connected to member-states’ domestic politics adopted in line with EU policies to better 
harmonize and integrate themselves into the Union. Turkey, as an applicant state for full 
membership, has made significant progress toward meeting political criteria established 
by the EU for applicant states.371This came as an official announcement from the 
European Commission of the EU in October 2004 and in December 2004; the EU 
decided that Turkey had the qualifications as an applicant to proceed to the next stage, 
which will be formal negotiations for full membership.372 
However, since then, Turkey’s candidacy has been facing closer scrutiny with 
regard to Kurdish Southeastern Anatolia, within the context of meeting the Copenhagen 
political criteria.373 According to these criteria, a membership requires that “the candidate 
country has achieved stability in institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.”374 The evaluation of the 
European Commission over the Southeastern Anatolia asserts:  
Overall the situation in the East and Southeast of the country, where 
people of Kurdish origin mostly live, has continued to improve gradually 
since 1999, both in terms of security and the enjoyment of fundamental 
freedoms. The emergency rule has been lifted and the return of the 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) has continued. Nevertheless, the 
situation of IDPs remains critical.”375 
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The above statement includes two contradictory issues that affect its final 
impression. The overall impression that the above statement leaves is that Turkey is 
performing well in meeting the political criteria in the aforementioned region, but the 
IDPs status remains critical. This latter issue nullifies the overall positive impression on 
the basis that, firstly, the return of IDPs is not being carried out sufficiently and; 
secondly, the overall status of the IDPs is critical. The EU hits “two birds with one stone” 
in its statement. At this point, it is essential to clarify that there are two categories of 
IDPs: those who abandoned their homes because of the armed conflict between the 
Turkish army and the guerrilla insurgency of the PKK that ended in 2002, and those 
evicted from their places due to the construction of the GAP project dams. This chapter 
will focus on those IDPs that resulted from the GAP project. 
That said, the issue of IDPs in the GAP region still lags behind and will 
undermine the position of Turkey in the year 2014,376 set to be the earliest date for 
initiation of formal negotiations for full membership.  I will examine the status of the 
IDPs within the frame of the Copenhagen political criteria. I will make a comparative 
analysis between the cases of resettlement practices and compensation during the 
constructions of the Keban, Birecik, and Ataturk dams and the Ilisu Dam. The three 
former dams were completed before 1999, while the latter’s construction work started in 
2008.  
1. Definition of Internally Displaced People: General Principles 
The definition of internally displace people, as well as some principles concerning 
them, according to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, is provided 
below: 
Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to 
leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result 
of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of 
generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made 
disasters… 
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Internally displaced persons shall enjoy, in full equality, the same rights 
and freedoms under international and domestic law as do other persons in 
their country. (Principle 1) 377 
 
Every human being shall have the right to be protected against being 
arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place of habitual residence, 
when this displacement is ought to large-scale development projects, 
which are not justified by compelling and overriding public interests.” 
(Principle 6.1.2(c))378 
 
Every internally displaced person has the right to liberty of movement and 
freedom to choose his or her residence. (Principle 14.1)379 
 
Internally displaced persons have the right to be protected against forcible 
return to or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or 
health would be at risk. (Principle 15(d))380 
 
2. Mega-Projects and Internally Displaced People: The GAP Project 
Mega-projects are those that bring rapid transformation to landscapes in a 
profound and very visible way, and which require intensive capital and state power.381 
They can be divided into four categories: 
a. Infrastructure (e.g., ports, railroads, urban water and sewer systems) 
b. Extraction (e.g., minerals, oil, and gas) 
c. Production (e.g., industrial tree plantations, export processing 
zones, and manufacturing parks) 
d. Consumption (e.g., massive tourist installations, theme parks, and 
real estate developments) 
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Mega-projects may involve multiple activities of all four categories, including 
hydroelectric plants to provide energy for supporting the activities.382 The GAP project, 
as an integral regional development, covers nine provinces in the Southeastern Anatolia 
region of Turkey in the fields of urban and rural infrastructure, agriculture, transportation,  
industry, education, health, housing, tourism, powerplants and irrigation schemes.383As 
such, it is a mega-project primarily based on dam constructions and hydroplant 
installations to support the activities. 
Before proceeding to the effects of the GAP project in Southeastern Anatolia in 
terms of population displacement and mitigating measures by the state, some dimensions 
of displacement at the social level must be pointed out. Planned eviction and 
resettlement, and loss of resource base in the project area due to construction and/or 
flooding are some of the main primary (direct impact) dimensions, followed by 
secondary (indirect impact) dimensions, such as loss of access to resources and property, 
unemployment, and psychosocial stresses, to name a few.384  
The construction of the dams in the GAP project requires land expropriation, and 
the evacuation of villages, and at the same time, calls for a resettlement process and 
compensation for the evicted. Since constructions of the first dam—Keban—was 
concluded in Southeastern Anatolia in 1974, the number of IDPs has reached 197,732, 
according to the Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI) in 1999. Other sources do 
not validate official Turkish sources with regard to the number of displaced. The same 
lack of validations has been noticed in determining the exact size of the IDPs due to the 
armed conflicts between the Turkish army and the PKK in Southeastern Anatolia. In 
Chapter II, the large variation in the numbers supplied by the Turkish state and the NGOs 
(IHD, UNHCR, and KHRP) were revealed. The KHRP, a pro-Kurdish NGO, gives the 
upper limit, the Turkish state gives the lower, and the rest of the NGOs roughly validate 
the KHRP. The United Nations (UN) takes a middle position on displaced persons 
determining the number to be around 1 million, while the Commission on Security and 
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Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) poises itself neutrally and legitimates both the numbers 
given by the Turkish state and the UN: 400,000 to 1 million.385  
Moving back to the number of persons displaced by the GAP projects, for the 
Ataturk Dam, the state claims 55,300386 were displaced. The EACH-FOR estimates that 
113,476 people were displaced.387 Based on a related report from a fact-finding mission 
in Southeastern Anatolia, The Corner House in the UK claims that the displaced range 
from between 150,000 to 200,000 people.388 Individual resources report that around 
350,000 (2004) people have been displaced by the GAP project, in total.389 The reason 
for the variation in  the IDPs exact size is due to the fact that most displacement statistics 
refer to the reservoir oustees only, a figure that is often far surpassed as other 
complementary parts of dam projects take place along with long-term ecological 
effects.390 Putting together the above information, the IDPs produced by the GAP project 
range from between 255,000 to 350,000 people. This discourse on the size of IDPs, as a 
result of the armed conflict and the GAP project, aims at highlighting the fact that the 
IDPs’ size, due to the GAP project is a serious fraction of the IDPs’ size due to the armed 
conflict. This is of great significance, as the EU’s statement on the overall situation of the 
IDPs of Turkey does not discriminate among the IDPs, but weighs them equally—
whether they are displaced by dams or armed conflict—which is the right thing to do,, 
speaking in terms of human rights. Another point emerging from the above is that the 
GAP project undoubtedly has increased the total number of IDPs.391 
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Having established the importance of that category of IDPs, the chapter will 
proceed to examine resettlement practices and compensations by comparing the cases of 
the Keban, Birecik, and Ataturk dams; and the case of the Ilisu Dam.  
a. The Keban Dam Case (Year of Completion: 1974) 
This dam was finished in 1974 with an initial estimation of 18,000 IDPs, 
but it ultimately reached 40,000, dissolving some 174 villages in the area surrounding the 
dam.392The dam’s development plan precluded any comprehensive resettlement for the 
population of the affected villages on the basis that the priorities of industrialization and 
urbanization collided economically with the issue of reintegration of the displaced into 
new settlements. Generally, resettlement means to be given a sufficient house to retain 
the social, economic and cultural life of the family and an appropriate plan for the 
economic survival of the family members.393 The general policy was to provide 
resettlement for as few as possible and compensation for the land expropriated. Large 
landowners and small holders were compensated, but not the landless peasants who were 
a relatively small group. 394 A large amount of money was lost to lawyers, middlemen 
and estimators, as they were involved in the expropriation process, and to large 
landowners. The small holders and sharecroppers received a small amount of money, 
which they either spent on consumption goods or real estate, but lacking the 
qualifications to deal with the urban job market, lost their money. These people, along 
with the landless, formed the biggest part of the IDPs congesting the urban areas as 
unskilled, unemployed and poor. This triggered an increase in demand for urban housing 
already in short supply to accommodate the newcomers, thus further contributing to the 
poor living conditions.395 
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b. The Ataturk Dam Case (Year of Completion: 1992) 
The Ataturk Dam case presents the Turkish state as being better organized 
from the perspective of offering physical or economic resettlement options to the IDPs. 
These options have to do with urban or rural resettlement and compensation in cash. The 
former is government led, while the latter rests on the arbitrary preference of the IDPs. 
There were 1,131 families who preferred governmental resettlement at the end of 2002, 
while 231 families would get their houses by 2004. Those not resettled at that time were 
accommodated in Adiyaman province, near their previous livelihood.396 However, there 
were a substantial number of IDPs who either preferred moving out to western Turkey or 
compensation in cash, as well as those not yet resettled.397  
Those paid in cash worsened their situation no matter what actions they 
took with their money. Some of them lost their money on gambling, others put it in the 
bank and had it quickly devalued as the inflation rates soared as high as 100%, while 
others started businesses but failed to hold them as they lacked business experience.398 
A fact-finding mission from the UK, having met with villagers affected by 
the dam, learned that 80% of them did not get compensation or replacement houses, 
while cash payments were often delayed and inadequate. The payments finally awarded 
were as low as one-sixth of the promised amounts to those who appealed to the courts 
and won their cases. However, a substantial amount of the awarded compensation was 
retained by local lawyers to process appeals in court.399 The above findings have been 
cross-checked from the Norwegian Refugee Council on IDP status.400 Those not 
compensated were forced to migrate to the urban areas and cities of the region, borrowing 
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money from relatives and selling a few things on the street.401 Most importantly, the 
villagers told the fact-finding mission that in the cases where land was offered as 
compensation to those who preferred rural settlement, the people disputed the land titles 
because properties often had more than one owner, while others had none, which led to 
bloody clashes. This latter seemed to be the predominant mind-set among the villagers as 
many of them claimed that, “resettlement had resulted in major social problems, 
including the breakdown of social networks, clashes and disputes over compensation, and 
resulting in injuries and death.”402 
That said, the Ataturk Dam case demonstrates better organized 
governmental dealing with resettlement and compensation than the Keban Dam case, 
though the process and the living standards of the IDPs are far from humane. 
c. The Birecik Dam Case (Year of Completion: 2000) 
This case is considered by Turkish authorities to have had a successful 
process of resettlement and compensation, allegedly on the basis that they had learned 
their lessons from previous experiences, such as the Ataturk Dam. According to one 
resource, the Birecik resettlement plan was more innovative than the Ataturk one in that 
that there was public participation in the process of resettlement. The GAP Regional 
Administration (GAP-RDA) launched a program under the title “Resettlement, 
Employment and Economic Investments of People Affected by Birecik Dam” to help the 
displaced people resettle and adapt to their new environments and a better life.403 To do 
so, consultancy offices were established to provide the displaced with information 
regarding the construction work of the dam and the program of resettlement and 
compensation, face-to-face surveys, educational programs to improve their economic 
situation and alternatives relating to the resettlement process.404 
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However, different resources claim that despite the attempts at a better 
resettlement program, the Birecik case displayed major failings in meeting international 
standards on improving living conditions, and restoring pre-displacement livelihoods and 
income earning capacities, to name a few.405 Of a total of 32,000 displaced, only 6,500 
resettled from the Halfeti region where 40% of the town named after it flooded when 
inundation of the dam was completed. Those who resettled were interviewed about the 
resettlement process. They complained about low quality housing and the problematic 
process of compensation, resettlement and financing, as they had to deal with multiple 
agencies that lacked coordination.406 Compensation was substantial, but the IDPs were 
faced with high expenses for the purchase of water, because the agencies were late 
making water connections to their homes. Houses unreachable because of the flooding of 
the dam reservoir were not compensated at all due to a particular regulation of the 
Turkish expropriation law. Most of the villagers had enjoyed regular incomes from local 
fisheries before resettlement, while after relocation to a barren hilltop they could not 
access the Euphrates River for a sustainable income.407 
A second source —also based on interviews from displaced people from 
three villages out of the forty-four, including Halfeti—gives a more precise picture of the 
perception that the resettled people had of the resettlement program. A majority, 82.5%, 
claimed that they were worse off after the resettlement. They used to live in bigger 
houses, while the current ones were smaller, and they had to live separated from their kin. 
Unemployment, which was non-existent before resettlement,  grew to 14.5% afterwards. 
Before resettlement, each family enjoyed two or three regular incomes, while after, more 
than 70% of them had between zero and one job to make ends meet for a family of 7 to 8 
persons. The provided infrastructure in the new resettlement was adequate in terms of 
water, electricity, access to roads and education. In regard to the compensations, most of 
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them believed that there had been no interest rate in the loans to enhance their 
compensation for the first five years after the resettlement. The interest rate had increased 
12%, and they claimed that they were not aware of any interest rate.408 
A third source claims that no resettlement plan was publicly announced 
and those evicted were not consulted, in violation of international standards. Those 
without land titles received no compensation. The inhabitants of some eighteen villages 
located close to the dam construction area were forced to abandon their homes when they 
awoke to find their houses partially submerged by the rising reservoir without receiving a 
warning. Those eligible for resettlement and who had been moved to new sites 
complained that their new houses were over-crowded and still needed to be finished.409 
d. The Ilisu Dam Case (Projected Year of Completion: 2013) 
The Ilisu Dam is going to be the second largest dam, after the Ataturk 
Dam, in the GAP region and is expected to evict from 50,000 to 78,000 people; most 
resources agree with this number, while the Turkish state claims that roughly 16,000 
people will be affected and have the right to resettlement. Kurdish sources report that half 
of the 78,000 evicted people hold no land titles; thus, they are not eligible for 
compensation according to Turkish law.410 
Dam construction works started in October 2008, bringing Turkish troops 
into the area  to strengthen the military presence near the reservoir in order to secure it 
from PKK guerilla fighters’ attacks. Consequently, visitors, locals and foreigners cannot 
enter the area without permission if they want to monitor the overall progress of the  
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project.411  In regard to the issue of the resettlement progress, I will base my facts on the 
year 2008 and before, as well as Turkish press reports from 2008 and up to the present 
time. 
As a follow-up to the 2004 EU’s critique of IDPs in Turkey, the Turkish 
state announced the undertaking of an initiative to create a special agency responsible for 
IDPs as well as respective amendments on the Law of Compensation. However, after a 
year, though it was only a short time, it had not yet established the proposed agency or 
made rulings under the Compensation Law.412 Moreover, in 2006 a rather harsh critique 
came from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
reporting that the overall planning for the construction of the dam was violating three key 
safeguard policies for hydropower projects set by the World Bank Group. One of the 
three is related to resettlement and asserts: 
failure to consult with affected communities, failure to put in place a 
comprehensive budget for income restoration or compensation measures 
and to include resettlement cost in total costs of the project, failure to 
accurately identify persons who will be affected by the project, failure to 
ensure land-for-land based resettlement; between 50,000 and 78,000 
people--mainly ethnic Kurds--are expected to be directly affected by the 
project. With no comprehensive budget for income restoration or 
compensation measures in place, no adequate resettlement sites available 
and no clarity as regards the number of affected individuals-many of 
whom have neither been informed nor consulted on the project, let alone 
given their consent – destitution will most certainly follow the dam 
construction.413 
A fact-finding mission in 2007 interviewed 260 households in villages in 
the Ilisu and Karabayir areas in regard to issues of resettlement and compensation. In 
general, the mission found that the affected people were not informed of their rights for 
resettlement and compensation; they had been told by the Directorate of State Hydraulic 
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Works (DSI) that only one site was available for resettlement. However, according to the 
villagers, the site was absolutely uninhabitable as it was situated on a steep rocky hill, 
without water, provisions or fertile land.  They suggested other sites but these were 
rejected by the DSI. According to the mission, all the villagers shared the view that the 
compensation they received was half the amount of the price of houses in the area. They 
accepted taking the money because they were not offered an alternative resettlement site; 
otherwise, they would have to have taken the site.  In the beginning they were supportive 
of the dam construction because the DSI promised them good land and compensation, but 
in the end they were much worse off.414  
A second report, assembled from a committee of experts on the 
resettlement issue based on facts gathered during its stay in the Ilisu area from March 10 
to 19, 2008 gives the whole picture, of what has been done at the federal and local levels. 
The conclusion of the report asserts: 
The preparedness of the resettlement remains unsatisfactory. The lack of 
preparation in the resettlement process creates an imbalance that 
jeopardizes the advance of the entire project. It also entails serious risks of 
impoverishment, destitution, and social disorganization for the massive 
population inhabiting the reservoir.415 
In particular, at the local level, the provision of information and 
consultation with the reservoir population was not conducted, selection and identification 
of new relocation land sites with the participation of the people was totally neglected, and 
compensation under Turkish Law was not paid at the replacement level costs, which still 
lags behind international standards.416At the governmental level, the Turkish state 
exhibited a tremendous capacity to establish various departments to address the issue of 
resettlement. For example, under the Directorate-General of Disaster Affairs, which is 
responsible for villages inundated by reservoirs, there is GAP-RDA under the Prime 
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Minister’s Office, which acts as the coordinator of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Affairs (MARA), the State Planning Organization (SPO), the Housing Construction 
Agency (TOKI) and the General Directorate of Forestry of the Ministry of Environment 
and Forestry. The paradox, according to the report, is that these agencies produce a zero-
sum result on resettlement, as they do not act together because they do not belong to the 
same brain; it’s one command, but has “fingers of different hands.”417 A new evaluation 
of the project, from another source, reports that the project of resettlement in Ilisu as of 
July 2009 presented no satisfactory results.418 
e. Remarks 
From the above cases, we can conclude that the Turkish state has not 
changed its attitude towards the IDPs in regard to the issue of resettlement and 
compensation, while it has demonstrated an increasing bureaucracy at the administrative 
level to address the issue, with no results. 
The Keban case shows that the state was not prepared to work out 
resettlement plans, despite the obvious fact that people were to be evicted from their 
homes upon completion of the dam. However, in the cases of the Ataturk and Birecik 
dams, the state demonstrated the will to carry out such plans. The Ilisu case, even though 
it comes later and after the EU criticism of the status of IDPs, does not show any 
improvement on the issue. 
All cases have many common things to demonstrate: 
  -The state resettles and compensates a small part of the total IDPs: only 
those who hold land titles.  
 -The amount of compensation is half the current price for housing and, if 
the IDPs choose to resort to courts, they are granted less money because of the amount 
extracted by lawyers. In the Birecik case, the IDPs from Halfeti town received substantial 
amount, but they faced high expenses due to unfinished work in their new housing. 
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 -The IDPs do not have adequate consultation on their rights to 
resettlement and did not participate in the process of selection of a new resettlement area; 
in other cases, they are ignored. 
 -The living conditions in the new resettlements are judged to be poor and 
not completed enough to accommodate the IDPs, with the Birecik case being the only 
exception. 
 -The living standards of the IDPs have worsened because of 
unemployment and poverty. 
 -Implicitly, the IDPs seem to nurture a feeling of distrust towards the state 
(Birecik case). Also, social tensions (Ataturk case) emerged in the form of disputes over 
land titles as a corollary result of Turkish laws discriminating against those eligible for 
resettlement and compensation  
On the other hand, tracing the organizational department of the Turkish 
state responsible for addressing the issue of IDPs, we notice that it follows an ascending 
trajectory that reaches a peak in the Ilisu case. However, the Ilisu case may be interpreted 
as an attempt by the Turkish state to respond to the EU criticism over the status of IDPs. 
Nevertheless, the fact is that, again, there is a gap between theory and practice in the 
state’s actions. 
3. Conclusions 
Within the broad context of Turkey’s prospect for accession to EU, Turkey has 
much work to do in regard to the status of IDPs. Since the Kurdish ethnic minority in the 
nation constitutes the majority of IDPs, Turkey must comply with the EU guidelines 
formulated by the Copenhagen political criteria for ethnic minorities in order to gain full 
membership. The four resettlement cases highlight the fact that the Turkish state has not 
taken adequate measures to improve the living standards of the IDPs, which violates 
international standards. Moreover, the issue of resettlement gains increasing importance  
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as it is considered to be part of environmental sustainability.419 In that light, Turkey 
violates not only EU rules, but also the project’s (GAP) philosophy of sustainability, as 
was mentioned in Chapter III. 
In regard to the issue of regional stability, the water regime is still fragile, 
characterized by political coercion by Turkey who uses water as a weapon with the GAP 
dams. Moreover, the basin presents a Janus face, with mutual cooperation between 
Turkey and Syria on the Euphrates but a lack of such cooperation on the Tigris River. On 
that side of the basin, the PKK insurgency from northern Iraq may inhibit future 
cooperation between Turkey and Iraq. In this light, we can conclude that regional 
stability is far from peaceful cooperation. 
Lastly, the issues of both human rights and regional stability, if taken together, 
have a common dimension, which is critical for Turkey. The issue refers to Kurdish 
populations inhabiting both sides of the Turkey-Iraq common border. The “external” 
threat of the PKK to Turkey, coupled with a possible “internal” social tension due to the 
adverse socioeconomic conditions in the Southeastern Anatolia region, will further 
jeopardize Turkey’s accession to EU. 
                                                 




This thesis addressed an assessment of the water development project (GAP) in 
Southeastern Anatolia in Turkey, which has been operating for the last two decades. In 
doing so, the thesis challenged the objectives of the GAP project at the national and local 
levels as stated by the Republic of Turkey. Additionally, the thesis expanded to the 
international level to assess the position of the project and its effects in terms of regional 
stability and human rights within the context of Turkey’s meeting EU criteria for its 
accession to EU membership.  
Also, the thesis dealt with two hypotheses that it are believed to be of 
significance. First, projections of adverse climate change and the impoundment of water 
in the reservoirs of the dams negatively affect the water quantity of the Euphrates-Tigris 
basin. Projections show a rising temperature by 30 C in Turkey by the year 2070, 
resulting in increasing the evaporation process. Additionally, the accrued surface water of 
the reservoirs of the GAP project furthers this trend. Climate change and the reservoirs, 
combined, constrain water quantity available for irrigation and, thus, adversely affect 
agriculture production in the GAP region. A corroborative fact for this is that water 
scarcity is one factor for the decreased irrigation rate, according to a study that examined 
twelve irrigation schemes in the region. The second hypothesis of the growing population 
of the three states—Turkey, Syria, and Iraq—is dealt with in the thesis as a future 
scenario that will increase the demand for water, exacerbating the water depletion 
problem. The thesis does not provide factual findings of the results of this hypothesis, but 
it gives an indication that the growing population will put pressure on the states to meet 
food needs. Implicitly, this is demonstrated by Syria’s complaints over not meeting its 
food and electricity needs. Moreover, Iraq, with a larger population than Syria, is more 
vulnerable in wheat and rice production. However, both states complained—primarily 
over depleted resources and, secondarily, for their growing population needs. These 
hypotheses are complementary to each other and constitute two of the dimensions for 
“environmental scarcity,” which is a provocative factor for conflict in the region.  
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Concerning the objectives of the GAP project at the national and local levels, the 
project demonstrates an inability to continue the impressive achievements seen at the 
beginning of its operation. Agriculture and energy sectors contribute to the nation’s 
economy, but with a significant asymmetry, to the detriment of the former sector. The 
Turkish state has realized that the energy sector is indulging in the profits of agriculture, 
which has problems that cannot be easily addressed, predicted, or even reversed. Climatic 
changes, water scarcity and salinity negatively affect the sector in terms of inhibiting the 
area to be irrigated and the production of the major crop (cotton). Not fulfilling the aim of 
irrigating 1.8 million hectares—since 1994 only 270,000 hectares (15%) have been 
irrigated—will act as a backlash to the state, as it will validate the WCD findings on the 
debatable issue of large-scale dams achieving their goals. According to the WCD, 
irrigation projects fall short in physical realization and are less profitable. Most 
significantly, manufacturing and agro-industry is based on cotton production in the 
Southeastern Anatolia region. The agro-industry is supposed to bring an increase in 
economic activities and to bear most of the burden of providing 3.8 million jobs; the 
projections for the year 2005 were to be 61% of this figure.420 Cotton production has 
reached a plateau since the 2001–2002 period of time, demonstrating a decreasing growth 
trend towards 2005. Up to 2009, it is predicted that the growth will be marginal given the 
extremely low rate of expansion of irrigated land after 2005. 
On the other hand, the WCD states that hydroelectric power dams are closer to 
their targets.421 The energy sector of the GAP project has been realized by 75% and by 
2013 will reach 88% upon completion of the dams of Ilisu and Cizre dams, newly under 
construction. The hydropower plants of the GAP project are more profitable than the 
irrigation projects without running into insurmountable obstacles affecting their 
effectiveness. Turkey has ever-increasing energy demands, and by exploiting the 
Euphrates-Tigris waters will lighten pressure on its energy production and economic 
deficit as a result of energy imports. Moreover, Turkey implicitly envisages exporting 
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electricity and gearing the nation to the EU energy grid, as the global energy demand is 
predicted to be on the rise. The investments planned for the energy sector for the years up 
to 2020 bear witness to the fervent support of the state for this sector. However, there is a 
limit on the economically exploitable waters of the GAP region, which brings up the 
issue that the energy sector of the GAP project will not keep up with the nation’s energy 
demand in the long term. In sum, the asymmetry of the sectors will continue to persist 
into the next decade.  
At the local level, this asymmetry will further exacerbate the socioeconomic 
status of the Southeastern Anatolia region, predominantly inhabited by Kurdish 
populations. The broad goal of the GAP is to develop this region by reducing the 
economic disparity between the region and the rest of Turkey within the context of 
human sustainability. Even though the region displays improvement in the GDP per 
capita, in absolute numbers, it is worse off economically—compared to the nation’s GDP 
per capita—than it was in the previous decade, 1990–2000. Furthermore, looking at the 
multiple objectives of the project, it turns out to be an infrastructural project rather than a 
human-oriented one. The state has focused heavily on the improvement of urban, health, 
education, transportation and communication infrastructure, neglecting the living 
standards of the region’s people. Failing to develop rural areas and slow down the rural-
urban in-migration, the state prepares to accept this migration wave in a materialistic 
way. Unemployment and poverty have not been alleviated and have even worsened when 
compared to the pre-GAP period, 1985–1990, which makes questionable the degree of 
access to public services. For example, many people cannot afford to send their children 
to schools or even find a job because they are unskilled. Even taking advantage of the 
CATOMs, which are popular, is not enough to make people eligible to find a job. The 
CATOMs seem to be doing a good job teaching cultural things to the people of the 
region, but not in qualifying them for finding jobs, as less than 1% does find a job. The 
socioeconomic failure of the project is further demonstrated by the state’s ineffective 
protection of the environment. Most dams were constructed without Environmental 
Impact Assessments Studies (EIASs) and continue to be constructed without them, as in 
the cases of Ilisu and Cizre. The international community has criticized the Turkish state 
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for its neglect of international standards for environmental protection. Besides 
environmental groups’ opposition to the GAP project, the European Commission has 
holistically and criticized these practices and procedures during the screening process of 
Turkey’s accession to EU. The criticism has also deepened of the status of Internally 
Displaced People (IDPs), which finds fertile ground in the treatment of ethnic minorities 
displaced by the GAP dams—within the context of Turkey’s meeting the political criteria 
of human rights for accession to EU  
At the international level, the GAP project becomes even more important as it 
complicates Turkey’s prospects for its accession to the EU in terms of regional stability 
and human rights. These two issues are of great concern to the EU within the context of 
its enlargement towards the Middle East.  
The EU acknowledges the water conflict in the Middle East and encourages 
peaceful solutions and cooperation among conflicting states. The Euphrates-Tigris basin 
is currently considered to be a water-contested basin. The GAP project spurred military 
conflicts between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq two times, in 1975 and 1990, due to unilateral 
construction of dams primarily, on the part of Turkey. Yet, the environmental concerns of 
Syria and Iraq as a result of the GAP project operation, add to the states’ tensions. 
Reduced flow of water and adverse water quality in terms of high levels of salts 
negatively affect downstream states’ economies when they face constraints to develop 
their irrigation and national energy goals. Turkey has taken great strides to promote a 
cooperative regime in the basin in alignment with the EU standards. The Asi Friendship 
dam on the Orontes River, undertaken in common by Turkey and Syria, is a promising 
indicator of cooperation in the basin, but it is still under discussion. However, Turkey’s 
hegemonic use of GAP dams as a tool to withhold water from Iraq, in order to extract 
Iraqi cooperation in clamping down on the PKK insurgency in its northern part, 
jeopardizes stability in the region for two reasons. First, it introduces an unresolved 
security dimension between Turkey and Iraq, and second, it contradicts the goal of 
promoting cooperation between Turkey and Iraq. In the absence of a bilateral water-
related agreements between Turkey and Iraq, and with the PKK insurgency still a factor, 
it is highly likely that the region will see a repetition of the scenario of the PKK being 
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used as a “trump” card by Iraq, further destabilizing the basin. In sum, Turkey still has a 
lot of road to cross before trilateral cooperation can be achieved in the basin, 
safeguarding regional stability. 
Meeting the political criteria of Copenhagen and, in particular, the respect and 
protection of ethnic minorities within the context of human rights, Turkey has received 
severe criticism from the EU in regard to the status of Internally Displaced People (IDP), 
which has delayed Turkey’s full membership. However, Turkey has not displayed the 
willingness to adopt policies that would improve the living conditions of the IDPs. 
Despite some general attempts, which were praised by the EU in 2004, the status of the 
IDPs remains critical. Moreover, Turkey has been scrutinized on the issue by other 
organizations, such as the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), which reported multiple violations in 2007, 2008, and 2009, including 
resettlement and compensation in the Ilisu case in Southeastern Anatolia. Turkey has not 
changed its practice on resettlement and compensation since 1974, causing IDPs 
destitution and impoverishment. The trend is clearly delineated in the Keban, Ataturk and 
Birecik dams’ cases. Instead, what has changed is the creation of more agencies to 
address the same issues without bringing desired results, as the agencies produce a zero-
sum result. This may be viewed by the international community as an obvious attempt to 
address the issue even though it is inconsistent with facts on the ground. The negotiations 
for Turkey’s full membership are set, at the earliest, for the year 2014; however, given its 
history of resettlement and compensation, Turkey is unlikely to meet the political criteria 
by that year, costing more delays in its accession process.  
In sum, the GAP project during the last decade has failed to continue its good start 
and seems to be reversing, especially in its essential socioeconomic objective to improve 
the living standards of the local people. With a failing agriculture sector and an energy 
sector that is promising for only a medium period of time, the GAP project is not 
sustainable. The Turkish state will continue to exploit what can be exploited in the basin 
in terms of economic revenues from the energy sector. However, at the international 
level, the GAP project has attracted the eyes of the international community for a long 
time and Turkey’s accession to the EU has been scrutinized, causing delays in the 
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accession process. The date 2014, set for full membership negotiations, will not be met, 
as Turkey has not yet improved its relations with Iraq regarding the issue of the basin’s 
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